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h-...A Report 
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New Case Filed - Personal Injury 
Filing: A4 - Personal injury Paid by: Carpenter Law Firm Receipt 
number: 0001190 Dated: 8/30/2012 Amount: $96.00 (Cashiers Check) 
For: Krinitt, Perry (plaintiff) 
Plaintiff: Krinitt, Perry Appearance Charles H Carpenter 




Affidavit Of Service 
Affidavit Of Service 
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or 
petitioner Paid by: Peter Johnson Receipt number: 0001348 Dated: 
9/27/2012 Amount: $.00 (Cash) For: State Of Idaho Department of Fish 
and Game ( defendant) 
Notice Of Appearance 
Defendant: State Of Idaho Department of Fish and Game Appearance 
Peter J Johnson 
Defendant: State Of Idaho Appearance Peter J Johnson 
Special Deputy Attorney General Appointment 
Answer, affirmative defenses and jury demand 
Notice Of Service of Discovery Requests 
Notice of Unavailability 
Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 01/22/2013 10:30 AM) 
Order setting planning and scheduling conference IRCP 16b 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Scheduling Conference 
Hearing date: 1/22/2013 
Time: 10:48 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Keith Evans 
Minutes Clerk: NICOLE 
Tape Number: 
Judge 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 01/22/2013 10:30 Michael J Griffin 
AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Keith Evans 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less 100 pages 
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 01/22/201310:30 Michael J Griffin 
AM: Hearing Held 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 05/21/2014 09:00 AM) Michael J Griffin 
Proposed Scheduling Order 
Hearing Scheduled (Final Pre-Trial Conference 05/06/2014 09:30 AM) 
Notice Of Service of discovery O O iJ U i{ 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
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Stipulation for Joint Discovery 
Notice Of Service of discovery requests 
Notice of unavailability 
Unopposed Motion to amend scheduling order 
Notice Of Service of discovery 
Notice Of Service of Discovery of Requests 
Notice Of Service of discovery 
Notice Of Service of discovery requests 
Notice Of Service of discovery 
Notice of unavalilability 
Certificate Of Attorney Peter J Johnson in support of Defendant's motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment as to the claims of Plaintiff Peralta 
Defendant's Motion For Parial Summary Judgment as to the claims of 
plaintiff Peralta 
Judge 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Memorandum of points and authorities in support of Defendants' motion for Michael J Griffin 
partial summary judgment as to the claims of plaintiff Peralta 
Note for Hearing--Denfendants' motion for partial summary judgment as to Michael J Griffin 
the claims of plantiff Peralta 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 01/21/2014 Michael J Griffin 
09:30 AM) 
Brief in opposition to partial summary judgment Michael J Griffin 
Affidavit of Eryn Krinitt Peralta Michael J Griffin 
Continued (Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 01/16/2014 10:00 AM) Michael J Griffin 
telephonic to Lewis County 
Notice Of Hearing 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Hearing date: 1/16/2014 
Time: 9:58 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Keith Evans 




Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary Judgment scheduled on 
01/16/2014 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Keith Evans 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less 100 pages 
telephonic to Lewis County 
Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary Judgment scheduled on 
01/16/2014 10:00 AM: Hearing Held telephonic to Lewis County 
Findings And Conclusions 
Summary Judgment 000U5 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
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Civil Disposition entered for: State Of Idaho, Defendant; State Of Idaho Michael J Griffin 
Department of Fish and Game, Defendant; Peralta, Eryn, Plaintiff. Filing 
date: 1/21/2014 
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment Michael J Griffin 
Memorandum of points and authorities in support of defendant's motion for Michael J Griffin 
summary judgment 
Certificate Of Attorney Peter J Johnson in support of defendants' motion for Michael J Griffin 
summary judgment 
Notice Of Service of discovery 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Judgment 04/16/2014 09:00 
AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Notice of taking deposition of Colin Sommer 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Notice Of Service of discovery Michael J Griffin 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on 04/16/2014 Michael J Griffin 
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 04/01/2014 09:00 AM) Michael J Griffin 
Notice Of Hearing 
Minute Order 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Scheduling Conference 
Hearing date: 4/1/2014 
Time: 9:02 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Keith Evans 




Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Continued (Jury Trial 09/22/2014 09:00 AM) Michael J Griffin 
Hearing result for Final Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on 05/06/2014 Michael J Griffin 
09:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 04/01/2014 09:00 Michael J Griffin 
AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Keith Evans 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less 100 pages 
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 04/01/2014 09:00 Michael J Griffin 
AM: Hearing Held 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Judgment 05/06/2014 10:30 
AM) 1st setting 
2nd will be 5-22-2014 at 1030 a.m. if trial's go in Clearwater County 
Notice Of Hearing 
Brief in opposition to motion for summary judgment 
Errata Exhibit A to certificate of attorney Peter J Johnson in support of 
defendant's motion for summary judgment 
OOOU6 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Date:)iL1712016 
Time. 27 AM 
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Continued (Motion for Summary Judgment 05/22/2014 10:30 AM) Michael J Griffin 
Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 05/05/2014 10:30 AM) tele in Michael J Griffin 
Idaho County 
Amended Notice Of Hearing 
Errata Certification of Charles H Carpenter 
Continued (Motion for Summary Judgment 05/30/2014 10:00 AM} 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 05/05/2014 10:30 Michael J Griffin 
AM: Hearing Held tele in Idaho County 
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 05/05/2014 10:30 Michael J Griffin 
AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Keith Evans 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less 100 pages 
tele in Idaho County 
Another Amended Notice Of Hearing 
Memorandum of points and authorities in response to plaintiffs brief in 
opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment 
Certificate Of Attorney Peter J Johnson regarding defendants' response 
memorandum 
Defendants' Motion to strike affidavits 
Defendants' memorandum of authorities in support of motion to strkie the 
affidavit of Larry Grandy 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE 
CERTIFICATION OF CHARLES H CARPENTER 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Motion for Summary Judgment 
Hearing date: 5/30/2014 
Time: 9:30 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Keith Evans 




Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on 05/30/2014 Michael J Griffin 
10:00 AM: Hearing Held 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on 05/30/2014 Michael J Griffin 
10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Keith Evans 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less 100 pages 
Notice of unavailability 
Findings And Conclusions 
Judgment 
Civil Disposition entered for: State Of Idaho, Defendant; State Of Idaho 
Department of Fish and Game, Defendant; Krinitt, Perry, Plaintiff. Filing 
date: 7n/2014 
00!JU7 
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Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 09/22/2014 09:00 AM: Hearing Michael J Griffin 
Vacated 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Michael J Griffin 
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Jones Brower & Callery Receipt number: 0000987 
Dated: 7/9/2014 Amount: $6.00 (Cashiers Check) 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid Michael J Griffin 
by: Carpenter, Charles H (attorney for Krinitt, Perry) Receipt number: 
0001160 Dated: 8/11/2014 Amount: $129.00 (Cashiers Check) For: 
Krinitt, Perry (plaintiff) 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 1161 Dated 8/11/2014 for 1163.00) Michael J Griffin 
NOTICE OF APPEAL Michael J Griffin 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Appeal Filed In District Court 
Request for entry of Final Judgment 
Judgment 
Amended NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 199 dated 9/29/2014 amount 
143.00) 
Acknowledgement Of Service 
Request for additional record 
Order for additional record 
Objection to record 
Notice Of Hearing on objection to record on appeal 
Hearing Scheduled (Objection 10/29/2014 02:00 PM) in Idaho County 
Hearing result for Objection scheduled on 10/29/2014 02:00 PM: Hearing 
Held in Idaho County 
Court Minutes 
Order 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 226 dated 11/4/2014 amount 
718.60) 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 227 dated 11/4/2014 amount 
301.40) 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Michael J Griffin 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copies Of Transcripts For Appeal Per Michael J Griffin 
Page Paid by: Krinitt, Perry Receipt number: 0001614 Dated: 11/4/2014 
Amount: $717.50 (Cashiers Check) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Fax Fee Paid by: Krinitt, Perry Receipt number: Michael J Griffin 
0001614 Dated: 11/4/2014 Amount: $1.00 (Cashiers Check) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Misc. Overage Paid by: Krinitt, Perry Receipt Michael J Griffin 
number: 0001614 Dated: 11/4/2014 Amount: $.10 (Cashiers Check) 
Acceptance Of Service--Johnson 
Acceptance Of Service--Carpenter 
Change Assigned Judge (batch process) 
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Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 11/19/2015 03:00 PM) 
Notice of scheduling conference 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Scheduling Conference 
Hearing date: 11/19/2015 
Time: 2:57 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Keith Evans 




Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 11/19/2015 03:00 
PM: Hearing Held 
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 11/19/2015 03:00 
PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Keith Evans 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less 100 pages 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10/17/2016 09:00 AM) 














Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 01/13/2016 10:00 AM) Mediation Gregory Fitzmaurice 
issues 
Court Minutes Gregory Fitzmaurice 
Hearing type: Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing date: 1/13/2016 
Time: 10:15 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Keith Evans 
Minutes Clerk: Nicole 
Tape Number: 
Johnson and Carpenter 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled on 01/13/2016 10:00 AM: Gregory Fitzmaurice 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Keith Evans 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less 100 pages 
Mediation issues 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled on 01/13/2016 10:00 AM: Gregory Fitzmaurice 
Hearing Held Mediation issues 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 01/22/2016 11:30 AM) Gregory Fitzmaurice 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled on 01/22/2016 11 :30 AM: Gregory Fitzmaurice 
Hearing Vacated 
Order for mediation Gregory Fitzmaurice 
Dat~,,·-~17/2016 
Timt.. . J:27 AM 
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Motion for summary judgment on the basis of statutory immunity Gregory Fitzmaurice 
Memorandum of points and authorities in support of defendants' motion for Gregory Fitzmaurice 
summary judgment and on the basis of statutory immunity 
Affidavit of Peter J Johnson Gregory Fitzmaurice 
Notice Of Hearing--Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis Gregory Fitzmaurice 
of statutory immunity 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Judgment 05/02/2016 09:00 Gregory Fitzmaurice 
AM) 
Brief in opposition to motion for summary judgment 




Court Minutes Gregory Fitzmaurice 
Hearing type: Motion for Summary Judgment 
Hearing date: 5/2/2016 
Time: 8:56 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Keith Evans 




Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on 05/02/2016 Gregory Fitzmaurice 
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Keith Evans 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less 100 pages 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on 05/02/2016 Gregory Fitzmaurice 
09:00 AM: Hearing Held 




Civil Disposition entered for: State Of Idaho Department of Fish and Game, Gregory Fitzmaurice 
Defendant; Krinitt, Perry, Plaintiff. Filing date: 6/1/2016 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 10/17/2016 09:00 AM: Hearing Gregory Fitzmaurice 
Vacated 
Defendants Motion For Reconsideration Of A Portion Of The summary 
Judgment Memorandum Order And Judgment 
Gregory Fitzmaurice 
Defendants Memorandum Of Authorities In Support Of Motion For Gregory Fitzmaurice 
Reconsideration Of A Portion Of The Summary Judgment Memorandum 
Order And Judgment 
Affidavit Of Peter J Johnson Gregory Fitzmaurice 
Verified Memorandum of costs and attorneys fees Gregory Fitzmaurice 
Defendants' motion to disallow a portion of plaintiffs costs and attorney fees Gregory Fitzmaurice 
Defendants' Memorandum in support of motion to disallow certain of 
plaintiff's submitted costs and attorneys fees 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/08/2016 10:00 AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 





Timt .1:27 AM 
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Memorandum in opposition to motion to disallow certain costs 
Affidavit of Charles H Carpenter 
Memorandum in opposition to motion to reconsider 






Court Minutes Gregory Fitzmaurice 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 7/8/2016 
Time: 10:54 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 




Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 07/08/2016 10:00 AM: Hearing Gregory Fitzmaurice 
Held 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Keith Evans 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less 100 pages 
Gregory Fitzmaurice 
Agreed upon calculations with respect to fees and costs Gregory Fitzmaurice 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid Gregory Fitzmaurice 
by: Carpenter, Charles H (attorney for Krinitt, Perry) Receipt number: 
0001029 Dated: 7/11/2016 Amount: $129.00 (Cashiers Check) For: 
Krinitt, Perry (plaintiff) 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 1030 Dated 7/11/2016 for 400.00) Gregory Fitzmaurice 
NOTICE OF APPEAL Gregory Fitzmaurice 
Order denying motion to reconsider Gregory Fitzmaurice 
Attorney fees order 
Judgment 
0 0 0 1 i 
Gregory Fitzmaurice 
Gregory Fitzmaurice 
PETER J. JOHNSON, ISB #4105 
Johnson Law Group, P.S. 
103 E. Indiana, Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 
Ph: (509) 835-5000 
Fax: (509) 326-7503 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 




IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND 
GAME and STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendants. 
NO. CV 12-146 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON THE BASIS OF STATUTORY 
IMMUNITY 
COME NOW Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Peter J. Johnson and 
Johnson Law Group, and move the Court for an order dismissing this action as a matter oflaw. This 
motion is made pursuant to the memorandum of authorities and affidavit of attorney filed in support 
of this motion and the pleadings on file herein. 
DATED: MarchlJ, 2016. 






Attorney for Defendants 
0001~ 
JOHNSON LAW GROUP 
I 03 E Indiana, Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT· I TEL: (509) 835-5000 FAX: (509) 326-7503 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
/ ·7 16.-1 hereby certify that on this __ day of March, 2016, I caused to be served a copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed to the following: 
Charles H. Carpenter 
Carpenter Law Firm, PLC 
210 N. Higgins Avenue, Suite 336 
Missoula, MT 59802 
Phone: (406) 543-0511 
Fax: (406) 258-0365 
[X] U.S. Mail 
· [ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
· [ ] Federal Express 
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DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
JOHNSON L'\ W GROUP 
103 E. Indiana, Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 
TEL: (509) 835-5000 FAX: (509) 326-7503 
Charles H. Carpenter 
Idaho Bar No. 8322 
Carpenter Law Firm pk 
210 N. Higgins Avenue Suite 336 
Missoula, Montana 59802 
(406) 543-0511 
carpentc@carpenterlawfirmplc.com 
Attorney far Plaintiff 
Lewis County District Court 
'"'"Ii ~ .. ~ D 
Af M~~~ocK{}_M 
APR 1 5 2016 





IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
FISH AND GAME, and 











) ________ ) 
No. CV 12-146 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Five years into this case, years after the deadlines for raising its affirmative 
defenses whether by answer, by amendment, or by motion for summary judgment, 
the Idaho Department of Fish & Game ("Fish & Game") has decided to assert that it 
was the "statutory employer" of plaintiff Perry Krinitt's ("K.rinitt") son, the decedent 
Perry Krinitt ("Perry"). As is discussed in more detail below, this affirmative defense 
is inapplicable as a matter of both law and fact. Even if this defense might lie, 
1 
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moreover, it has been waived by defendants in this case. For one or both of these 
reasons, the Court should deny Fish & Game's motion for summary judgment. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Perry, a very experienced helicopter pilot, was killed when an employee of Fish 
& Game negligently let her clipboard exit the cockpit and strike the tail rotor. See 
Krinitt v. Department if Fish & Game, 357 P.3d 850 (Idaho 2015). Perry was at the time 
an employee of Leading Edge Aviation LLC, which was under contract with a United 
States government agency - the Department of Interior ("DOI") -- to provide certain 
flight services to DOI and other entities, including Fish & Game. The Leading Edge 
contract was part of DO I's nationwide Aviation Management program. In its 
appropriations request for fiscal year 2010, DOI explained the purposes of the 
program as follows: 
The Aviation Management Directorate (AMD) provides safe, efficient, and 
cost-effective aircraft to accomplish Department of the Interior missions. 
Much of this activity involves unique and potentially hazardous flight profiles 
such as law enforcement, aerial fire fighting, low-level wildlife surveys, and 
placement of scientific personnel in remote locations. Safety is of paramount 
importance in executing these missions. 
In addition to providing aviation services through the Departmental Working 
Capital Fund, AMD coordinates Interior's aviation policy oversight and system 
management. This structure provides an independent safety overview of bureau 
aviation programs by an office removed from direct bureau mission pressure. 
Additionally, this effort provides Department wide direction of the aviation 
management program. 
Coordination between AMD and the bureaus is accomplished through 
individual bureau aviation managers, the National Fire and Aviation Executive 
Board, the National Interagency Aviation Council, the Fire Executive Council, 
2 
00 ii I 5 
and various other boards and committees. This centralized approach to 
aviation service delivery and policy development and oversight extends to each 
bureau, avoiding unnecessary aviation management duplication. 
US DOI Budget Justifications FY 2010, Office of the Secretary, Department-Wide 
Programs, at D0-121. The contract is structured as a fixed fee for services contract, 
thus DOI did not reimburse Leading Edge for specific costs, such as workers 
compensation insurance premiums. 
Contrary to the inference Fish & Game wishes the Court to draw, there was no 
contract between Leading Edge and Fish & Game. Nor, as is clear from the 
documents and the goals of this national federal program, does DOI act as a 
contractor "under" Fish & Game. 
Within the time set forth in the Idaho Tort Claims Act (IC§ 6-905), I<rinitt 
filed an administrative claim with Fish & Game (served on the Secretary of State). 
The purpose of this filing requirement is to "(1) save needless expense and litigation 
by providing an opportunity for amicable resolution of the differences between 
parties, (2) allow authorities to conduct a full investigation into the cause of the injury 
in order to determine the extent of the state's liability, if any, and (3) allow the state to 
prepare defenses." Pounds v. Denison, 120 Idaho 425, 426-27 (1991) (quoting Farber v. 
State, 102 Idaho 398,401 (1981)). If, as it now seems to believe, Fish & Game was 
Perry's statutory employer, this would have been the time for it to so inform Krinitt. 
Certainly, all the material facts asserted by Fish & Game in its motion were known to 
it at this time. Instead, Fish & Game said nothing. 
3 
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On August 30, 2012, Krinitt filed this action. Under I.R.C.P. Rules 8(c) and 
12(b), Fish & Game was required to set forth its affirmative defenses in its answer. It 
did not assert that it was the statutory employer of Perry. Instead, it proceeded to 
defend the case on the merits, developing through costly and time-consuming 
depositions facts it hoped to use to defend the case on the elements of Krinitt's 
negligence claim. The Court ordered deadline for amending pleadings (February 2013 
- fully two years after Krinitt had filed his administrative claim) came and went 
without Fish & Game raising any additional affirmative defenses. A copy of the 
contract between Leading Edge and DOI was produced in discovery. Numerous Fish 
& Game employees, including the regional supervisor, were deposed concerning the 
accident. None ventured a theory that Perry was colorably a statutory employee of 
Fish&Game. 
Krinitt traveled to Spokane, Washington to be deposed- at considerable 
expense and inconvenience - and still Fish & Game made no mention of the 
contention that it was, or even might be, Perry's statutory employer. Fact discovery 
closed at the end of September 2013: because Perry's status as a virtual employee of 
Fish & Game had never been raised, Krinitt did not take any discovery from DOI 
concerning whether DOI, contrary to the sense of its separate contracts with Leading 
Edge and Fish & Game, considered itself a contractor "under" Fish & Game. 1 
1 Discovery from federal officials in a state civil matter is subject to the rule of United States ex rel 
Touf?y v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951), and not lightly undertaken. 43 C.F.R. §§ 2.81 & 2.84. 
4 
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Krinitt engaged experts, incurring tens of thousands of dollars in fees, who 
offered opinions on the elements of his negligence claim. Fish & Game also engaged 
an expert - Fish & Game's expert made no mention of a statutory employer defense, 
but instead addressed the merits of Krinitt's negligence claim offering an opinion that 
Leading Edge was at fault for the accident. Krinitt engaged a further expert (again at 
very considerable expense) who submitted a rebuttal report, showing that for a 
number of reasons, the Fish & Game's expert's conclusions were unfounded. 
Fish & Game moved for summary judgment on January 31, 2014, the Court 
ordered deadline for filing such motions. It did not raise any issue pertaining to 
immunity, but instead argued the elements of I<rinitt's negligence claim. After the 
motion was filed, but before I<rinitt's response was due, the parties each took the 
deposition of the other's principal liability expert - both depositions were in Denver, 
and, again, Krinitt incurred considerable costs. I<rinitt responded to the summary 
judgment motion, and Fish & Game filed a reply brief, again never hinting that it had 
a defense of immunity. The Court- then Judge Griffin - heard oral argument, which, 
again, focused on the elements of negligence and the facts relevant to them; no 
mention was made by Fish & Game of any immunity defense. The Court granted the 
motion, issuing an opinion that was confined to the elements of I<rinitt's negligence 
claim. The Court made no mention of any immunity defense. 
Krinitt appealed to the Supreme Court. Fish & Game did not raise statutory 
employer immunity as an alternate ground for affirmance, nor did it make any 
5 
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mention of this defense in its brief. Neither Fish & Game, nor any justice, made any 
mention of statutory employer immunity at oral argument, nor was there any mention 
of this defense in the Supreme Court's opinion reversing the Court's grant of 
summary judgment. 
Likewise, Fish & Game made no mention of this defense when counsel 
conferred prior to the scheduling conference with the Court, during the scheduling 
conference, or during the later conference with the Court at which an allocation of 
expenses for the Court ordered mediation was discussed. Fish & Game did not raise 
the issue prior to Krinitt incurring significant costs and inconvenience (including 
cancelling surgery to accommodate Fish & Game's schedule) in connection with the 
mediation, or prior to travel to the mediation site, although it could have done so 
without harm. Even now, it offers no excuse whatsoever for its failure to raise the 
issue in a timely fashion. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Fish & Game was not the Statutory Employer of Perry 
As Fish & Game itself recites, the heart of the workers compensation scheme is 
a trade-off. In return for "sure and certain" compensation, without having to litigate 
fault, the workers compensation statutes provide the exclusive remedy for claims 
against an employer.2 This trade-off is only for the benefit of employers, however, 
2 This trade-off is what makes the abrogation of remedies provisions of the workers compensation 
scheme constitutional. See Venters v. Sorrento DeL, Inc., 141 Idaho 245,252 (2005). In the context of a 
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and does not protect third-parties. I.C. § 72-223. Contractors and subcontractors 
"under" an employer are included in the definition of employer for this purpose, I. C. 
§ 72-216, and are therefore not third parties. It has long been recognized that the 
statutory definition of employer used here is not merely broader than common 
understanding, but broader than the common law definition. The key element, rather 
than control (as it would be under the common law), is privity: 
The relation thus established is purely statutory. The legislature for the purpose 
of the compensation act created the relation of employer and employee 
between independent groups who never before had borne, and who do not 
now under the common law bear that relation to each other. It forces liability 
upon parties who are in priviry of contract. 
Tucker v. Union Oil Co., 100 Idaho 590,593 (1979) (emphasis added). The Supreme 
Court's decision in Ruffing v. Ada Counry Paramedics, 145 Idaho 943 (2008), is directly 
on point: without privity, there simply is no statutory employer relationship. As noted 
above, this emphasis on privity is made explicit in the statute. I.C. § 72-216. In order 
to prove it was Perry's employer, then, Fish & Game must show tl1at Leading Edge, 
and DOI, were contractors "under" Fish & Game. 
This emphasis on privity directly serves the purpose of the statutory scheme. 
"[T]he Idaho Code sections dealing with the concept of statutory employer 'are 
non-dependent parent's case, the trade-off is pure illusion: in return for giving up the cause of action 
provided for him in section 5-311 of the Idaho Code - under which he may claim only damages for 
his own injury, and not those of his son, see Pfau v. Comair Holdings, 135 Idaho 152 (2000)-Krinitt is 
provided exactly nothing. See Stample v. Idaho Power Co., 92 Idaho 763 (1969). 
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designed to prevent an employer from avoiding liability under the workmen's 
compensation statutes by sub-contracting the work to others."' Venters, 141 Idaho at 
251 (quoting Spencer v. Al/press Logging, Inc., 134 Idaho 856, 860 (2002), and Adam v. 
Titan Equipment Supp!J Co., 93 Idaho 644, 646 (1970)). While the Supreme Court has 
rejected the notion that bad motive must be shown before an entity may be an 
employer, Gonzalez v. L.amb Weston, Inc., 142 Idaho 120, 123 (2005), it is entirely 
appropriate to scrutinize the contracts between the parties with the purposes of the 
statutory program in mind. Even privity may not be enough to create a statutory 
employer, depending on the character of the contracts. See, e.g., Harpole v. State, 131 
Idaho 437 (1998). There is no authority, though, and certainly none cited by Fish & 
Game, for going outside the bounds of actual privity in finding that some entity or 
other is a statutory employer. See also Baugh v. Gale Lim Holdings, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 96658 (Dist. Idaho) ( denying summary judgement when fact dispute existed as 
to existence of contract). 
It is not disputed that Perry was employed by Leading Edge, and was 
performing at the time of the accident pursuant to Leading Edge's contract with DOI. 
Fish & Game's new immunity theory only possibly works if Leading Edge is a 
contractor under DOI and DOI is a contractor under Fish & Game. No case cited by 
Fish & Game supports the latter point, nor indeed, does it fit either the structure of 
the federal program, or the general relationship between states and the federal 
8 
0002~. 
government. First, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held 
that the United States is not the statutory employer of the employees of government 
contractors under the laws of Idaho. Kirk v. United States, 232 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1953). 
This is sufficient to end the matter: the chains of liability and privity - which are the 
basis for the statutory employer provision - are broken. Federal employees are not 
included in the Idaho workers compensation scheme, but instead have their own 
avenue for compensation under federal law.3 Just as under the statutes reviewed in 
Kirk, federal employees are excluded from the current Idaho scheme in at least two 
ways: section 72-205 conspicuously omits federal employment from its definition of 
"public employment," while section 72-212(7) exempts from coverage injuries where 
federal law provides the remedy. Similarly, under the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy 
Clause, the federal status of Leading Edge's contract takes it out of the scheme set up 
in the Idaho Code. Krinitt could simply not have held Fish & Game liable under the 
Idaho workers compensation statute had both Leading Edge and the DOI failed to 
provide workers compensation coverage, because DOI had no obligation to provide 
coverage under Idaho law, federal law, or any contract between DOI and Fish & 
Game. 
3 Congress can subject, and has subjected, certain federal employees and contractors to state workers 
compensation schemes. This legislation does not cover Perry. In addition, a federal agency can be a 
statutory employer when, under a cost reimbursable contract, it has paid the workers compensation 
of its contractor's premiums. See Stmhs v. Protective Technologies, Inc., 133 Idaho 715 (1999). DO I's 
contract with Leading Edge was not cost reimbursement, but was fixed fee. 
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Leading Edge was not a contractor of Fish & Game. Because the United States 
is a supreme, sovereign entity, DOI is not either in fact or in law a contractor "under" 
Fish & Game, and thus Leading Edge is not a subcontractor under Fish & Game, 
within the meaning of sections 72-216 and 72-223. Under its contract with DOI, for 
example, Leading Edge's remedies for contract claims were under the federal Contract 
Disputes Act. Contract, 1 C.1, incorporating 48 C.F.R. 52.212-4(d) (attachment 2 to 
Johnson Aff. at LEA001468). Leading Edge could not have had any remedies in 
contract against Fish & Game. Claims arising in tort against DOI, or, indeed, against 
Leading Edge, would also be controlled by federal law, see Bqyle v. United Technologies 
Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1988), and would need to have been brought in the 
appropriate forum. Fish & Game's tort liability here is based on its employee's fault, 
pursuant to Idaho Code 6-903, and could never have been based on its purported 
"employment" of DOI, and, through DOI, of Leading Edge under Idaho Code 72-
216 and Spencer v. Allpress Logging, 134 Idaho 856 (2000), had Leading Edge not 
participated in the workers comp program. 
Potential employer liability is not merely the statutory basis for immunity, it is 
also the basis for the constitutionality for the workers compensation scheme. As the 
Supreme Court explained in Venters, 
In return for fixing absolute liability on the primary contractor or operator of 
the facility (including making sure the primary operator only uses contractors 
who comply with the Act), Section 8 of the Act grants to the primary 
contractor or operator of a facility immunity from suits under the common law. 
The quid pro quo under the Act still exists because I.C. § 72-223's_grant of 
10 
immunity comes only in connection with absolute liability on the part of the 
primary contractor or business operator to provide benefits under the Act if 
the employee's direct employer fails to do so. The fact that the primary 
employer may keep § 72-223's grant of immunity even though the direct 
employer has paid benefits and fulfilled its obligations under the law does not 
render the statute unconstitutional. 
141 Idaho at 252. In the circumstances here, because the liability chain between 
Leading Edge's employees and Fish & Game is broken by the federal character of the 
contracts each has ·with DOI, and by DOI's own federal identity, application of 
statutory employer immunity would be a due process violation. 
That is, whether one traces the purported privity chain from Fish & Game, or 
the purported liability stream from Leading Edge, DOI sits athwart both chains, 
breaking them both. 
Idaho was not the employer of Perry, any more than it is the employer of any 
convenience store employee who might wait on a state employee, even if the plain 
language of the statute might be stretched to cover such a situation. This is true even 
if the convenience store employee is directed to serve such customers as appear in the 
store - and may be directed to help specific customers load groceries in their cars, or 
to pump gas into a customer's car at the store's gas pumps - but this does not create 
the chain of privity or liability required by the Idaho Code. Similarly, the Southwest 
Airlines pilot who flew Fish & Game's counsel to California for the mediation in this 
case, although his employer was paid by the state to do so, was not a statutory 
employee of the State of Idaho. 
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Leading Edge may have had more of a relationship to Fish & Game than 
Southwest Airlines, but no contract was produced in discovery or attached to the 
motion, and indeed, none exists, that makes Fish & Game the statutory employer of 
Perry. More fundamentally, this works no injustice: nothing about t~e arrangements 
between Fish & Game and DOI on the one hand, and between Leading Edge and 
DOI on the other, were designed to allow Fish & Game to evade liability for Leading 
Edge's employees. They are, rather, designed to meets the needs of a nationwide 
federal program. Thus, both the language and the purpose of the statutory employer 
provision are inapplicable here. 
Fish & Game's burden on a motion for summary judgment was to show that 
Leading Edge was, without question or dispute, a contractor or subcontractor 
"under" Fish & Game. If the contracts show otherwise, or if there is even some 
ambiguity on the issue, summary judgment must be denied. The evidence Fish & 
Game has appended to its motion do not sufficiently and indisputably support its 
position. 
Even if the immunity defense had not been waived - and it clearly has been - it 
cannot be invoked by Fish & Game in the circumstances of this case. Summary 
judgment should be denied. 
B. The Statutory Employer Immunity Affirmative Defense has been Waived 
That statutory employer immunity is an affirmative defense that can be waived 
by failure to timely present it was conclusively established by the Supreme Court in 
12 
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Fuhriman v State, 143 Idaho 800, 803-04 (2007).4 That Fish & Game has waived the 
defense here is equally conclusively established by its conduct: not only did Fish & 
Game fail to raise the defense at the various opportunities available to it (including 
some that are mandatory under the rules) - (a) investigation of Krinitt's administrative 
complaint; (b) its answer; (c) an amendment filed by the Court-ordered deadline for 
amending pleadings; (d) its motion for summary judgment filed on the deadline for 
motions for summary judgment; (e) the appeal before the Supreme Court -it has 
instead elected, and thereby compelled Krinitt, to litigate the merits of his negligence 
claim. 
As noted above, and repeatedly by the Supreme Court, the purpose of the 
workers compensation scheme is to create a "sure and certain" method for injured 
employees to assert their claims without having to prove fault, and, in return for this 
"sure and certain" system, to immunize employers from litigation. Allowing Fish & 
Game to assert an immunity defense after forcing I<rinitt to incur tens of thousands 
of dollars of costs and litigate fault for years, including before the Supreme Court, is 
the direct antithesis of the result sought by the legislature. It is clear from the holding 
of Fuhriman that Fish & Game had the legal right to litigate the merits of Krinitt's 
4 Fish & Game characterizes the statutory employer immunity defense in its brief as "jurisdictional," 
Br. at 5 (citing Rhodes v. Sunshine Min. Co., 113 Idaho162 (1987)), but this is clearly wrong. Nothing 
in Rhodes lends any support to this characterization, but even if it did, the holding in Fuhriman would 
have overruled it. 
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negligence claim rather than to assert an immunity defense: this is what deciding that 
an affirmative defense is waivable means. 
Thus, Fish & Game had an option: litigate the elements of Krinitt's negligence 
claim, or assert its immunity defense, providing the "sure and certain" relief. It has 
certainly litigated fault in this case. What Fuhriman does not stand for, nor any other 
authority cited by Fish & Game, is the proposition that a party can litigate fault all the 
way to the Supreme Court and then, only when it has lost on its contentions regarding 
fault, emerge from the weeds with a new affirmative defense.5 
The Supreme Court noted in Fuhriman, as in Bluestone, that an affirmative 
defense may first be raised on summary judgment because the Rules allow pleadings 
to be amended, and amendment is fairly permissive. Parties do not have unlimited 
rights to amend, however. Under Rule 16, the Court was required to set a deadline for 
amendments of the pleadings, and for summary judgment motions. It did so with 
respect to both here. Under Rule 16(b), these deadlines may not be modified absent a 
showing of good cause. None has been shown. Rules 15 and 56 each include timing 
provisions, and in both, a scheduling order from the Court is controlling. Fish & 
5 In Fuhriman, the Supreme Court followed its holding in Bluestone v. Mathewson, 103 Idaho 453 
(1982), allowing an affu:tnative defense first raised in a timely motion for summary judgment. The 
Blues tone court had carefully distinguished a defense raised for the first time on appeal - citing 
Paloukos v. Intennountain Chevrolet Co., 99 Idaho 740 (1978) - and relied on I.R.C.P. Rule 1 (a)'s 
instruction that the Rules are to "be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding ... " 103 Idaho at 455. Allowing Fish & Game to 
assert its waived affirmative defense at this. late date is in no way faithful to Rule 1. 
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Game's motion does not meet these deadlines, and does not even attempt to argue 
good cause. 
Even when the deadline is extended, as these deadlines have not been, a party 
that wishes to amend its pleading must still obtain leave of court. This is not 
automatic either, but is dependent on certain factors not being present. 
In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad 
faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure 
deficiencies by amendment previously allowed, undue prejudice to the 
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of 
amendment, etc.-the leave sought should, as the rules require, be 'freely 
given.' 
DAFCO UC v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 156 Idaho 749, 755 (2014) (quoting Smith v 
Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 272 (1977)). In addition to simple timeliness, 
[a]ppropriate factors to consider include whether the proposed amendment 
would delay upcoming hearings or trial, whether the motion to amend comes 
after court-imposed deadlines have passed, and whether substantial work has 
already been completed .... For example, in Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., the 
plaintiff filed motions to amend several months after the deadline for filing 
motion to amend pleadings had passed. 141 Idaho 604, 613, 114 P.3d 974, 983 
(2005). There, "the district court stated: 'We are now two years into this case, 
the time to amend pleadings has passed, and two discovery deadlines have 
expired. It is now simply too late to further amend the substance of the 
pleadings .... " Id. 
Id. at 7 56-57. Here, amendment is futile, for the reasons made clear in the foregoing 
section of the brief. Fish & Game's delay was certainly undue - the deadline for 
amendments expired more than 3 years ago, and the deadline for filing motions for 
summary judgment passed more than 2 years ago - while in the interim Krinitt, and 
two courts, were actively litigating fault. Fact discovery is long closed, precluding 
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Krinitt from getting confirmation from federal officials that DOI is not a contractor 
"under" Fish & Game. Clearly, a great deal of work has gone into this case, including 
appellate review of merits Fish & Games now contends are irrelevant. These are 
sufficient bases to deny leave to amend (or otherwise assert the defense). In contrast, 
the Supreme Court found that a three year late amendment to assert an affirmative 
defense was permissible in West v. El Paso Products, 122 Idaho 133, 135 (1992), but only 
because the defendant made its motion as soon as it learned of the facts underlying its 
defense. Here all the material facts asserted by Fish & Game were known to Fish & 
Game when Krinitt filed his administrative claim, more than 5 years ago. 
But the most compelling reason for denying amendment is the undue prejudice 
that amendment would visit on Krinitt: he has invested time and money, heart and 
soul, in this litigation as structured by Fish & Game's decision to contest fault. His 
approach would have been substantially different had Fish & Game timely raised its 
contention in a timely manner. So too would the Court's approach, and that of the 
Supreme Court. For this (apparently, in Fish & Game's view) vast waste of Krinitt's 
time and money, and the time of this court and of the Supreme Court, Fish & Game 
offers neither explanation nor apology. Amendment may be permissive under the 
rules, but the Court should not allow it to be abusive. 
In all the circumstances here, it is simply too late to allow Fish & Game to 
assert a previously waived affirmative defense by motion for summary judgment. The 
Court can and should exercise its discretion to so hold. 
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C. In the Alternative, if the Court Permits Fish & Game to Assert Statutory 
Immunity, the Court should Award Krinitt Costs 
Rule 15(a) not only enjoins the Court to deny leave to amend when doing so 
does not serve the interests of justice - and denial is entirely appropriate in this case, 
as noted in the preceding section of the brief - it also has the explicit authority to 
award costs to the non-moving party, as a way of mitigating the harm it has suffered 
in litigating a superseded version of the case. These costs may include attorneys fees. 
Curtis v. Ketchum, 111 Idaho 27, 31 (1986). Krinitt would much prefer that the Court 
reject Fish & Game's abusive last minute attempt to assert its long-since waived 
immunity defense in this case, and believes that failure to do so would be an abuse of 
discretion. In the alternative, however, he requests that if the Court allows Fish & 
Game to assert immunity at this point in the case, he be awarded costs including 
expert fees (as were necessarily incurred in the particular circumstances of this case, 
not merely to the extent allowed as of right in Rule 54(d)(1)(C)(8)), attorneys fees, 
costs associated with the mediation6, filing and service fees, and all other costs 
incurred in the prosecution of this action. This would apply whether The Court grants 
the motion for summary judgement, or denies it leaving the genuine issue of material 
fact as to the existence of a contractual arrangement sufficient to make Leading Edge 
"under" Fish & Game. Should the Court adopt this alternative, Krinitt can submit a 
bill of costs in a timely fashion following its ruling to that effect. 
6 Failure to assert its immunity defense prior to allowing I<.rinitt to incur the expense and 




For the foregoing reasons, Krinitt requests that the Court deny Fish & Game's 
motion for summary judgment. 
DATED THIS 13th day of April, 2016. 
Respectfully subfnitted 
2-= 
~h~ H. Carpenter 
, 2n~iwraR LAW FIRM, plc 
210 N. Higgins Ave., Ste. 336 
Missoula, MT 59802 
Telephone :(406) 543-0511 
Facsimile: ( 406) 258-0365 
carpentc@carpenterlawfirmplc.com 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify on the 13th day of April, 2016, I served the foregoing by mailing 
a true and correct copy to: 
Peter J. Johnson 
JOHNSON LAW GROUP 
103 E. Indiana, Suite A 
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND 
GAME and STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendants. 
NO. CV 12-146 
DEFENDANTS' REP Y 
1\l!EMORANDUM IN UPPORT OF 
MOTION FORS Y 
JUDGMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Defendants' (hereinafter "IDFG") motion is premised upon its qualifi ation as a statutory 
employer pursuant to the Idaho Worker's Compensation Act ("Act"). In order t guarantee orkev' s 
compensation coverage, Idaho employs a statutory scheme allowing an injured orker to 1 ok to all 
entities in the line of hire, as far back as the genesis of the job if necessary, too tain cover ge. This 
look back for coverage is provided regardless of questions of fault and of the r lation of 1 parties 
to each other. The quid pro quo for this avenue to sun, and certain cove e is that rorke,,, 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR SUMMA.RY JUDGMENT - I 
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S kane, WA 99 07-2317 • 
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compensation is provided to the exclusion of every other remedy, except for · ited circ tan<;es 
expressly provided for in the act. Therefore, each entity along the line of hire s immune from t~rt 
actions because of this exclusive remedy rule. Those entities are charac rized as ·t1atutqry 
employers" for the purposes of worker's compensation. Based upon the st lutes refer /n 
IDFG' s supporting brief, IDFGwa.s a statutory employer of Perry J. Krinitt, Jr., 'Krinitt") and, thus, 
is immune from any tort action arising from his work-related injuries under exclusiJ remedy 
rule. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTIONS. 
In opposition to IDFG's motion, Plaintiff argues three points; 1) IDF 
argue that it is a statutory employer; 2) IDFG did not have a contract with Le 




"federal status" of. the contract, Idaho's worker's compensation laws do not apply. The~e 
contentions find no support in the law. 
B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF STATUTORYEMPL 
IS APPROPRlA TE. 
1. The Issue Is Time ether It Is One Of Jurisdic · 
The courts have held that the issue of immunity as a statutory emplo er is eithe one ?f 
jurisdiction or one of an affirmative defense. See Rhodes v. Sunshine Min. Co., 
742 P.2d 417 (1987) (relief for injured workmen and their families is provide to the exc\rusion of 
every other remedy and civil causes of action and all jurisdiction of the courts o the state oiVer su~h 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY M:EMORANPUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JU))OMENT - 2 
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causes is abolished); and Fuhriman v. State, Dep't ofTransp., 143 Idaho 800, 8 3-04, 153 .3d 4~0 
(2007) (immunity through qualification as a statutory employer is an affinna · e defense . 
It is well-established law that subject matter jurisdiction is never wai ed and th t lack :of 
jurisdiction may be raised at anytime. Baird-Sallaz v. Sallaz, 157 Idaho 342, 34 , 336 P.3d 275, 278 
(2014); see also Doe v. Doe (In re Ttirmination of Parental Rights of Doe), 58 Idaho 14, 616 
(:W 15). In addition, it is well-settled Idaho law that !he issue of statutory emp yer ~ty <My 
be raised as an affirmative defense for the first time by summary judgment moti n at any p int prior 
to trial, so long as the opposing party is provided time to respo0:d to the mo on. Fuhri an, 14 3 
Idaho at 803-04. Idaho law is clear that IDFG' s motion, whether termed as a j isdiction issue pr 
as an affirmative defense, is appropriate and timely. 
2. The Issue Was Not Waived. 
Plaintiff argues that IDFG waived the issue of whether it was a statuto employer because 
it did not plead the issue as an affirmative defense or raise the issue on appeal d that to \ow raife 
it requires a motion to amend the pleadings. As discussed above, if the statuto employelissue i. s 
one of subject matter jurisdiction, it may never be waived and it may be raised t any time Baircl-
Salla:z, 157 Idaho at 345. If the issue is an affinnative defense, IDFG's answer led the af nnative 
defense that "Plaintiffs have foiled to state a claim upon which relief can be btained." f=J,, 
Affirmative Defenses and Jury Demand, pg. 3. Furthennore, the affmnative efense of itatutory 
employer immunity may be raised for the first time on a motion for summary j gment. F\hriman, 
143 Idaho at 803-04. A motion to amend pleadings is neither necessary norm dated. l : 
Plaintiff cited Fuhriman for the proposition that "anaffinnative defense .. can be ·ved by 
failure to timely present il" Opposition Brief, pg. 12. However, Fuhriman do not 1 for 1hl., 
JO SON LAW GROUP. 
03 E. Indiana, s'µite A 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT Sp e, WA 99207-2317 · 
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT• 3 TEL: (509) JS-5000 FAX: (509) 326-7:503 
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proposition and, in fact, clearly holds otherwise as to the statutory employer i unity i sue. The 
appellants in Fuhriman argued that the statutory employer immunity was waiv because J was ~ot 
raised in the pleadings. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed and ruled that the issue may le raised 
for the first time on summary judgment. The Court's holding is on point with 
IDFG's present motion. 
uppo~ 
Fuhriman was employed by Multiple Concrete Enterprises, Inc. {Multip e ), which f8 hired 
by the State of Idaho, Department of Transportation {State) to provide work on a road conktructibn 
project in Oneida County, Idaho. An accident occurred killing and injuring s eral of Jultiple's 
employees. Fuhriman' s family members, among others, brought a wrongful dea 
suit against the State. The State filed a motion for summary judgment assertin 
as a statutory employer because it had contracted with Fuhriman' s employ , Multiple. for the 
project. The Idaho Supreme Court agreed: 
[T]his Court has held that an affmnative defense :may be raised r the first 
time on a motion for summary judgment. Bluestone v. Mathewson, IO Idaho 451 
455, 649P.2d 12091211 (1982).Inthatcasetheplaintifffiledamotion rsummary 
judgment alleging a defense she did not plead in her reply to the defen ant's cross[ 
complaint. We recogni:z:ed that some federal circuit courts have held that party mus~ 
plead affirmative defenses. However, we declined to follow that 1i e of case~. 
Though we noted an affumative defense cannot be raised for the rst time o' 
appeal, we held "that where the defense was raised before tr· l and the 
defendant was given time to present argument in opposition, the d ense ... c~ 
be raised for the first time in the summary judgment motion. 11 Id. l 
The issue then becomes whether the defense was raised before trial and hether th 
1 
defendant was given time to argue in opposition 1:o the defense. The S te's actu1 
Motion for Summary Judgment does not mention immunity. It moved r sutnmarz 
judgment on the basis that Appellants failed to state a claim upon whic reliefma1 
be granted. The State filed a Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment concurrently with its Motion for Summary Judgm t. 
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The State's Memorandum clearly alerts Appell- as to its position that a stauJ 
employer it is immune from statutory liability. Ten days later, the Ap ellants :filel:l 
their reply brief discussing statutory employer immunity and asserting at the Sta~ 
is not a statutory employer. Debate over statutory employer immunity ontinued ip 
the hearing held on the State's Motion for Summary Judgment. The arties then 
submitted additional briefing to the court. Thus, the Bluestone req · ement tbJt 
"the defendant was given time to present argument in oppositio " was met, 
Appellants were alerted to the immunity defense by the M morandu' 
accompanying the State's Motion for Summary Judgment and ad time to 
respond and present their opposing argument. 
Therefo.-e, we hold summary judgment was proper and that the S 
waive its affirmative defense of immunity. 
Fuhriman, 143 Idaho at 803-04 (emphasis added). See also, Patterson v. Stat 
PAGE 06/25 
Welfare, 151 Idaho 310,316,256 P .3d 718, 724(2011) (party does not waive an affinnative defense 
for failing to raise it in the initial answer, so long as it is raised before trial an 
has time to respond in briefing and oral argument). 
gparty 
Plaintiff argues that IDFG should have raised the issue of statutory em layer junity m 
the appeal brought by Plaintiff. Plaintiffs appeal concerned the sole issue of w ether IDF! shouid 
have been granted summary judgment upon the basis that speculation was req · d to dis em who 
had control of the clipboard prior to it exiting the helicopter. IDFG responded to · s issue o appe!'!,l. 
However, contrary to Plaintiff's argument and pursuant to Fuhriman, IDFG c uld not haJe raised 
1he statutozy immunity issue on appeal. However, it is appropriate for JDFG t raise the irue in a 
motion for summary judgment. \ ·• 
Plaintiff further contends that the Court in Fuhriman based its holding o the permissiveness 
of the rules allowi~g amendment of pleadings. Opposition Brief, pg. 14, To the ontrary, F~hriman 
held: 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5 
00037 
I 
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S kane, WA 99207-'1.317 




Since Bluestone controls, the Court need not reach the State's argumen that even i 
it is required to plead the defense of immunity, the failure to do so is h ess erro1 
due to liberal pleading amendment rules. 
Id. at 804. 
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The law is clear that IDFG,s summary judgment motion for dismi sal based pon its 
inununity as a statutory employer for any claims arising from an on-the-job inj of Leading Edg~' s 
employee Perry J. Krinitt is appropriate. 
C. IDFG CONTRACTED WITH LEADING EDGE FOR SERVICES. 
It is difficult to understand Plaintiffs argument that there was no contr ct between Leading 







"ACRONYMS AS USED THROUGHOUT'IHISCONIRA T AREAS 
FOLLOWS: 
IDFG Idaho Dept. of Fish & Game" 
''CLIENTS: 
State of Idaho Fish & Gamet Dept." 
"SECTION C - TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
C8.3 The nature of the services expected der this 
contract(s) will be to support a variety of DOI sers and 
IDFG within the lower 48 United States.11 
See Affidavit of Peter J. Johnson, Attachment No. 3, pp. LEA-001444, 0 1447, and 001476 
( emphasis added). 
DEFENDANl'S' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
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00038 
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Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72·102 (13)(a): "'Employer' meansanypers 
or impliedly hired or contracted tb.e services of another. It includes contractors 
An employer who makes use of a contractor's or subcontractor's employees q 
one statutory employer and is immune from suits in tort Venters v. Sorrento 
245, 108 P .3d 392, 396 (2005). At the time of the accident, Leading Edge"'.85 
and pilot, Krinitt, to IDFG to condu~t a salmon survey pursuant to its con 
Leading Edge failed to provide worker's compensation coverage to Krinitt, 
would have been pennitted under Idaho statutes to claim coverage from IDFG 
employer. In providing this guarantee of coverage by allowing Krinitt to look b 
to obtain coverage from an entity not his direct employer, the Idaho Legisla 





ill.es as a category 
el., Inc., T ! Idaho 
viding aTlicoprer 
t with ID1G. Had 
initt and is fam~y 
Krinitt' s rtuto:ry 
kin the · e ofhlre 
Legislature granted inununity to those defined as statutory employers. See I.C §§ 72-:20 , 72-2i 1 
and 72-223. 
Plaintiff further argues that IDFG hired DOI and that it was DOI that 
Consequently, Plaintiff a,:gues there was no direct relationship between JDFG and Looig Edge. 
Rather than this argument depicting a break in the chain that would terminate th statutory employer 
analysis, it supports a fmding that there was a contractor/subcontractor relatio ship, a relJtions~p 
the Courts have held does not extinguish statutory employer status. See Kola v. Cassia County, 
Idaho, 142 Idaho 346,353 127 P.3d 962 (2005). 
Kolar was employed by JUB Engineers, who was hired by Burley · ghway Diftrict, to 
provide engineering services on a road project for a U.S. Forest Service road. K lar, while it the job 
l 
I : 
site, was run over by a vehicle driven by a Burley Highway District employee. Burley an1 Albion 
JO SON LAW ~ROUP 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FO:R SUMMARY JUDGMENT· 7 
00039 
03 E. Indiana, Suite A 
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Highway Districts and Cassia County (hereinafter jointly referred to as "Highw y Districts') jointly 
maintained the road wider a mainrenance agreement with the U.S. Forest Servic and the Ut Forest 
Service provided the funds for that maintenance. Kolar sued the Highway Di · cts as t1,d parties 
and the Highway Districts moved for sununary judgment. The district co granted Junun~ 
judgment finding that the Highway Districts were Kolar's st,tuto,y em~loyers d immune ~m suit 
Kolar appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holdi g that the highway 
Districts were an "employer'' within 1he meaning of that tenn as fourul in I. C. 72-223(1 Lnd 1.C. 
§ 72w216. See also Liberty Nort'hwest Ins. Corp. v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dis:l LEXIS 
138291.The Supreme Court further held that there was no support for Kolar' argumen, that the 
statute violated due process. Kolar, 142 Idaho 346. 
Even under Plaintiff's scenario that IDFG contracted with DOI and OI contra ted with 
Lea.ting Edge, IDFG is still be entitled to a statutory employer status beca,ise i would be table for 
worker's compensation coverage as an entity_m the line of hire Leadmg Ed e and its eFploy~e 
I • 
Krinitt. j' 
l'laintiff argues that the facts of this case are analogous to the facts in R mg v. A Counry 
Paramedic;, 145 Idaho 943, 188 P.3d 885 (2008). However, Ruffing is cle ly disting1shab{e. 
I • Ruffing, the plaintiff, was a firefighter with the City of Boise. While on du , he responded tQ a 
medical emergency call. The Ada Coun1y Paratnedics also responded to same c.+ After 
medical assistance had been rendered, the patient was loade~ into an ambulanc being dri
1
en by an 
Ada County Paramedics employee. As the ambulance was backing up to leave, i struck a patked car, 
allegedly pinning Ruftlng between 1he two vehicles: Rufl:ing bro~ suit ainst A1 County 
Paramedics and its employee. Ada County filed a motion for summary Judgm t clam:ung, among 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM lN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION .FOR SUM:MARY JUDG?vmNr - 8 
00040 
I • I . 
JO NSON LA WIGROUP 
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I . 
other things, that it had statutory employer status because of the joint operatio between i and ~e 
City of Boise. Although the agencies worked together, Ada County did not ontend thje was a 
contractual relationship between them. The Court held that because there no evidJnce of a 
contract, there could be no statutozy employer relationship. Id., 14 5 Idaho at 94 7 In R,l/llngl the C!ly 
of Boise Fire Department and the Ad.a Cowt:y Pata:medics simply responded o the saror call for 
medical assistance - there was no contractual relationship. In this case, even ccepting Pll.aintifr s 
contentions arguendo, IDFG contracted with DOI, and DOI tbon contraoted "th ~g Edge. 
Ruffing is inapposite for application to the facts of this case. Construing the rela ionships i!this case 
as they are clearly shown on the face of the contract, IDFG and DOI contract with Lea · g Edge 
for aviation services. Leading Edge undisputedly employed Krinitt as a pil 
statutory employer of Krinitt. 
D. IMMUNITY IS NOT EXTINGIBSHED BY TIIE PRESENC OF J u'.: .. s. 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR (''DOI") IN THE CONTRACT 
Plaintiff argues that the "federal status of Leading Edge's conttact take it out of the scheme 
set up in the Jdah<, Code" and tb,tt "[t]his is sufficient to end the matter." Op osition B1f, pg.: 9. 
Plaintiff cites a 1953 case for the proposition that the United States may not be statutory jmplo~er 
under the laws ofldaho (Kirkv. United States, 232 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1953)). owever, Is is not 
current law. The application ofldaho's worker's compensation laws to a Unit d States d~partment 
was addressed by the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho in the unp blished d ision' of 
Liberty Northwest Im. Corp. v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138291 2011 WL 6002468 
( copy attached), in which the Court held: "[S]tatutory employer immunity un er Idahd s orker' s 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY :M:EMOMNDUM IN SUPPORT 
OP MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 9 
00041 
J HNSON LAW GROUP 
l 03 E. Indiana,! Suite A · 
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TEL: (SO ) 835-5000 FT.: (509) 326-7503 
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Compensation Act can apply to the United States.'' Id. at * 9 ( citing LaBarge v. ariposa, 
798 F.2d 364,367 (9th Cir. 1986). 
Jn Liberty Northwest, a subrogation claim, Perkins, an employee ofExtr e Electri , slip~ 
and fell on ice while exiting a work vehicle at Mountain Home Air Force B e. He suJmitted a 
~!aim !or worker'~ compensation benefits with L~, Atreme El<ciric', w rker com,onsatiOn 
msurer, which paid benefits. At the time of the accldent, Parsons Evergr ne was the general 
contractor on a construction contract with the Anny Corps of Engineers on a roject at Jountain 
Home Air Force Base. Parson subcontracted with Extreme Electric. I 
In the subrogation action, Liberty, as subrogee of Extreme Electric and erkins, all ged that 
. I . 
the United States through the Department of Defense, the Department of e Air FOircei and 
Mountain Home Air Force Base were responsible for and negligent in the remo al of sno4 and ice. 
The Court in analyzing the statutory employer status of the defendants di not foe, on the 
government as a whole or "monolithic entity,'' but instead examined the agen ies involv1 in the 
matter. Id. at * 11. The Court found that there was no evidence connecting the Dep ent 9f 
Defense, the Air Force, or the Base to the general contractor or subcontractor ut rather \at if any 
entity was entitled to claim statutory employer status, it was the Army Corps of ngineers, the entity 
which contracted for the project. Id. 
Plaintiff places undue emphasis on the term "under" and points to the remaey cir ,uid 
1he inclusion of1he United States DOI in the contract. In essence, Plaintiff ar es that ,use the 
DOI is a federal agency, it swallows the presence of the IDFG in the contract d erases 1·e IDFG 
from the line of hire in a statutory employer analysis. Opposition Brieft pg. 11. laintiff s igument 
I 
fiiils here as it did for the U.S. Government in Liberly Northwest. When XaJllined tom the 
JO NSON LAW pROUP 
03 E. Indiana,~ itc A 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT s k:ane, WA 99 7-2317 
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viewpoint of an injured WOiker whose direct employer failed to provide cover , Plainjs theo:' 
would eliminate access to coverage. Plaintiff's theory in practice is that when U.S. Govfmment 
department (e.g., DOI) is a party in a contract, regardless of other entities . the contrrt (e.g.~ 
IDFG), the line of hire stops at and includes only the U.S. Government entity ( .g .• DOI)f entity 
to which, Plaintiff argues, the !doh<> worker's compensation law.a do not appl . 'Ilus is s" ply not 
the law. , 
Plaintiff urges this Court to hold that IDFG did not hire the services o Leading lge, and 
thus the services of Leading Edge's employee Krinitt, despite IDFG control · g the flighl, paying 
Leading Edge for the flight, and contracting with Leading Edge for aviation s ices. See .Affi,davit 
of Peter J. Johnso~ Attachment No. 2, pg. 4. 18; pg. 3, 14; and Attachment N . 3. This is contrary 
to the undisputed evidence and the law. IDFG is entitled as a matter oflaw t statutory E}mployer 
status. 
E. THE AW ARD OF COSTS rs NOT w ARRANTED. 
Plaintiff seeks an award of costs pursuant to Rule lS(a). However, 
above, leave to amend the pleadings is not required. Furthermore, IDFG's 





. ~ I 
otion 1.or ~ummary 
d of costl for this 
IDFG qualifies as a statutory employer of Leading Edge and its employe s. Pursu t to clear 
and succinct Idaho law, it is entitled to immunity so long as the defense is aised priJ to trial. 
I 
I . 
Therefore, IDFG respectfully requests that the Court grant its motion di missing ~laintifr s 
complaint 
OEF.ENDANTS' REPLY .MEMORANDUM IN SUP:{)ORT 
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CORPORATIONS 1-10, Defendants. 
Case Summary 
Civil Procedure > .. . > Su mary 
Judgment > Entitlem nt as M tter of 
Law > Genuine Dispu es I ·. 
Civil Procedure > ... > Sufi mary 
Judgment > Entitlem nt as M tter of 
Law > Need for Trial 
HNl One principa purpole of 
· Overview summary judgment i to isolafe an~ 
U.S. was not entitled to summary dispose of factual! unsupported 
judgment in a negligence and claims. It is not a disfavored 
subrogation action filed by a workers' procedural shortcut, but is i~stead 
compensation insurer that paid · the principal tool by hich factually 
benefits to a worker who slipped and insufficient claims or efenses fan be 
fell on an air force base. Idaho Code isolated and prevente from going to 
Ann. § 72-223 statutory immunity trial with the attenda t unwartanted 
did not apply to U.S. under facts of consumption of publ c and P,rivate 
case, and Idaho premises liability law resources. The mer existeryce of 
did not create strict liability for which some alleged factual d spute b~tween 
the U.S. could not be found liable the parties will n t defeat ail 
under the FfCA, 28 U.S.C.S. §§ otherwise properly su ported rhotion 
1346(b), 2674. Further, it was not for summary ju gment; \ th~ 
clear from the record whether the requirement is that there fue no 
independent contractor had a duty to genuine issue of mate ial fact.l .. 
dear the roads and sidewalks of snow 
Civil Procedure > Judgme111ts > 
and ice as alleged by the U.S. Summary Judgmen > Evidentiary 
Outcome 
United States' motion for summary 
judgment denied. 
Considerations I · 
HN2 The evidence, includi~g · all 







2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138291, *138291 
1 
• 
drawn therefrom, must be viewed in for summary judgme t. Inste~d, the 
a light most favorable to the party opposing sum ary judgment 
non-moving party in a motion for must direct the cou 's atten~ion to 
summary judgment, and the court specific triable facts. tateme~ts in a 
must not make credibility findings. brief, unsupported y the record, 
Direct testimony of the non-movant cannot create an issu of fact.I · 
must be believed, however 
implausible. On the other hand, the 
court is not required to adopt 
unreasonable inferences from 
circumstantial evidence. 
Civil Procedure > ... > Summary 
Judgment > Burdens of Proof> Movant 
Persuasion & Proof 
Civil Procedure > ... > Summary 
Judgment > Burdens of Proof > 
Nonmovant Persuasion & Pr-oof 
Civil Procedure > ... > Summary 
Judgment > Opposing Materials > 
l\r,..,..m,-,~nuinn r'lnr1 ,m,=,.nt~tinn 
HN3 Tht: rnuvi1 lt.1 ur.11 ly bears the 
11 IILIQI UUI UCII VI ·t.n::!111v11 ... 1.n.n.111~ ......... 
;..=-..:-_-_-;-~---:;..4:" ;-1 -· ... T:,..:·l.'.:. .. _:-: 4!..r =--.... ,-.._, .r. • ., • .; 
party need not introduce any 
QfllllllQl,.IV~ CVl'-lwll ..... '-' \. .... u..... ... ... 
affidavits or deposition excerpts) but 
may simply point out the absence of 
evidence to support the nonmoving 
party's case. This shifts the burden to 
the non-moving party to produce 
evidence sufficient to support a jury 
verdict in his favor. The non-moving 
party must go beyond the pleadings 
and show by his affidavits, or by the 
depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or admissions on file 
that a genuine issue of material fact 
exists. However, the court is not 
required to comb through the record 
to find some reason to deny a motion 
Workers' Compensa ion & S DI > 
Coverage > Emplo ment St tus > 
Employers 
Workers' Compensa ion & S~DI > 
Defenses > Exclusivi Provisions . 
Business & Corporat Compli+nce > 
... > Workers' Compe sation & ~SDI > 
Exclusivity > Employ es & Em layers 
Workers' Compensa ion & S
1 
DI > 
Third Party Action > Third Party 
Liability f 
HN4 Generally, un er the Idaho 
)#_Yi,rl fC::"~~ r-t•HllPny"_"l ~ 1. I Jrrrf:.1f7 
, I • • 1• " .1 '-• •••• -·~·-· e •• 
........ L-• • ... •••••••-..••--1':'.,,. -•••• . a'iiows ·an· irijurEic{ eiiipiovee· t-~~:~·ek 
-'-····-~-- r-. ~ .. ,; .. • .. .I I. I . ... t. • .r 
parties, even if thee ployee is also 
entitled to worker's compen~ation. 
However, such thir -party liability 
claims cannot be a serted ~gainst 
I . 
so-called "statutory e ployeri," who 
are either: (1) th se em, loyers 
described in Idaho Code nn. ·§ 
72-216, having under \ them 
contractors and subc ntractors who 
have in fact com lied witlh tlie 
provisions of Idaho Code 4nn. § 
72-301 or (2) the ow er or lessee of 
premises, or other erson ~ho :is 
virtually the propriet r or opetiator of 
the business there c rried on1 Idaho 
Brenda Winebarger I 
I 
00046 
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Code Ann. § 72-223. To identify a 
statutory employer, the ·court first 
considers the statutory definition of 
"employer" found at Idaho Code Ann. 
§ 72-102(13)(a). There, "employer" 
is defined as any person who has 
expressly or impliedly hired or 
contracted the services of another. 
This definition includes contractors 
and subcontractors. An employer who 
makes use of a contractor's or 
subcontractor's employees qualifies 
as a category one statutory employer 
and is immune from suits in tort. 
reasonable analogy, and most courts 
have held that the United ,states 
should be entitled to the same 
immunity from suit enjoyed by a 
private employer co ered b state 
workmen's compe sation laws. 
Accordingly, the U.S. District Court 
for the District of I aho fin s that 
statutory employer i munity under 
Idaho's Worker's Co pensation Act 
can apply to the Unite StatesrWhen 
analyzing whether th United tates 
is a statutory empl yer, the court 
must focus on th agency or 
department of the United !states 
Torts > ... > Liability > Federal Tort which contracted for he workl : 
Claims Act> Elements I · 
Torts > . .. > Liabili > Federi
1
a1 ·rort 
Workers' Compensation & SSDI > Claims Act > General Overview : 
Coverage > Employment Status > 1 
Employers Torts > Public En ity Uab]"lity > 
Liability > Vicarious iability · 
Business & Corporate Compliance > 
... > Workers' Compensation &SSDI > Torts > Strict Liab lity > · eneral 
Exclusivity > Employees & Employers Overview \ · 
HNS The Federal Tort Claims Act HN6 Under the Fede al Tort Paims 
(FTCA) provides a limited waiver of ~ct, the United States cannot ~e held 
sovereign immunity. That limited lrable on any state law imposin; strict 
waiver permits tort actions against liability. Additional! the United 
the federal government, but the States may only be eld liabl~ if its 
United States is liable only in· the. own employees acted egligently and 
same manner and to the same extent cannot be held liable u der the theory 
as a private individual under like of vicarious liability. 28 U.S.t.s. § 
circumstances under the law of the 1346(b). 
1
1 
place where the act or omission 
occurred. 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 1346(b)r Tort~ > ... > Duty n ~remjises > 
2674 Th N
. th c· ·t . 
1 
. Invitees > General o erv,ew I 
• e in 1rcu1 , in ana yzing 
an action brought under California's HN7Under Idaho tort aw, empJoyees 
worker's compensations laws, held and workmen, or thos who cdnfer a 
that although the federal government tangible benefit to the landownbr, are 
could never be exactly like a private treated as invitees. A I ndowne~ owes 
actor, a co~rt's job _in applying the a ~ommon law duty of care jto an 
standard 1s to find the most Invitee to keep th premises in 
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reasonably safe condition, or to warn 
of hidden or concealed dangers. 
However, this is not strict liability, 
i.e., if an invit~e is injured if the 
premises ~re in reasonably safe 
condition, or if warned of hidden or 
concealed dangers, the landowner is 
not liable for such injuries. 
Torts > .. , > Comparative Fault > 
Multiple Parties > General Overview 
Workers' Compensation & SSDI > 
Third Party Actions > Third Party 
Liability 
HNB Under Idaho law, where both an 
employer and third party are deemed 
negligent, the employee's damages 
are apportioned between the 
employer and third party. 
counsel: [*1] For Liberty Northwest 
Insurance Corporation, Individually 
and as Subrogee of Extreme Electric, 
Inc, Plaintiff: Mark D Sebastian, 
Matthew Owen Pappas, ANDERSON 
JULIAN and HULL LLP, Boise, ID. 
For United States of America, 
Defendant: Warren S Derbidge, LEAD 
ATTORNEY, US AlTORNEY'S OFFICE, 
Boise, ID. 
Judges: Honorable Ronald E. Bush, 
U. S. Magistrate Judge. 
Opinion by: Ronald E. Bush 
Opinion 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER 
Currently pending bef re the Court is 
Defendant United Stat s ofAm~rica's 
Motion for Summary J dgmen~ (0kt. 
2a). I 
I. BACKGROUND 
on February 27, 200 , Sean trkins 
("Perkins"}, an emplo ee of E treme 
Electric, exited a work vehicle n Fox 
Hunt Loop on the M untain !Home 
(Idaho) Air Force Bas , slippe~ on a 
patch of ice and fell, in urin·g hi I back. 
{Comp!., 111 11, 13, 0kt. 1.) The 
vehicle was driven by a fellow 
Extreme Electric e ployee, Ryan 
Schaeffer. (Perkins D p., p. 3 , Dkt. 
28-8.) Perkins later ad surgery on 
his back in July 2009 (Comp\, at ,i 
14.) Plaintiff Ube Nortihwest 
Insurance Corporati n ("Li~ertyu) 
alleges that at the time qf the 
accident, the road as comJl,letely 
covered with ice and here appeared 
to be no salt, s nd or I other 
maintenance to add re s the icf. (Id. 
at, 13.) i 
I 
As a result of [*2] his injury, Perkins 
submitted a claim for w9rker's 
compensation benefit with Liberty, 
Extreme Electric s vyorker 
compensation insurer, which paid out 
benefits to Perkins in he amoG\ nt of 
$74,436.32. (Id. at 1] 5.) · 
At the time of the ac ident, PJrsons 
I 
Evergreene . ("Parso s") was the 
general contractor on a constr~ction 
contract with the A my CoMps of 
Engineers to constr ct 148 new 
military housing u its on the 
Mountain Home Air Force !Base. 
I 
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Parsons subcontracted with Extreme 
Electric for the electrical work to be 
done in those housing units in March 
2007. (Derbridge Aff., Exs. A &. B, 
Dkts. 28-4, 28-5.) 
In this negligence and subrogation 
action, Liberty (as the subrogee of 
Extreme Electric and Perkins) alleges 
that the United States of America 
("the Government") caused injury 
which resulted in the payment of 
worker compensation benefits. 
Liberty alleges that the United States, 
through the Department of Defense, 
the Department of the Air Force, and 
Mountain Home Air Force Base, 
owned and operated property in 
Elmore County, specifically Fox Hunt 
Loop, and was responsible for the 
maintenance of the property, 
including removal of snow and ice. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A- The Summary Judgment 
Standard 
HN:l. One (*3] principal purpose of 
summary judgment "is to isolate and 
dispose of factually unsupported 
claims .... " Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S. Ct. 
2548, 91 L. Ed. ?d 265 (1986). It is 
"not a disfavored procedural 
shortcut," but is instead the "principal 
tool [ ] by which factually insufficient 
claims or defenses [can] be isolated 
and prevented from going to trial 
with the attendant unwarranted 
consumption of public and private 
resources." Id. at 327. "[T]he mere 
existence of some alleged factual 
dispute between the arties Jm not 
defeat an othe ise pr'pperly 
supported motion for suTmary 
judgment; the requi ement is that 
there be no genuine i sue of mlaterial 
fact. 11 Anderson v. Lib Lobb , Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 247· 8, 106 S. Ct. 
2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 20 (1986 . 
HN2 The evidence, includi g all 
reasonable inference which 111ay be 
drawn therefrom, mu t be viewed in 
a light most favo able tb the 
I . 
non-moving party and the Courj! must 
not make credibility fi dings. i'~e id. 
at 255. Direct 'test mony of the 
I . 
non-movant must be be~ieved, 
however implausible. eslie V, !Grupo 
IC~, 1_98 F.3d 1152, 1159 C:fh C(r. 
1999). On the other and, th~ Court 
is not required to ado unreas,mabl:e 
inferences from circums~antial 
evidence. McLaughlin . Liu, 849 F.2d 
1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 988). 
HN3 The (*4] movi g party bears 
the initial burden of demonstrating 
the absence of a ge uine is~ue of 
material fact. Deven ux v. A:bbey, 
263 F.3d 1070, 1076 9th Cir. · 001). 
To carry this burden, t e movin , party 
need not introduce ny affirijnative 
evidence (such as affidav,t~ or 
deposition excerpts) ut may simply 
point out the absence of evid~nce to 
support the nonmovi g party's case. 
Fairbank v. Wun erman \ Cato 
Johnson, 212 F.3d 52 , 532 (9.lth Cir. 
2000). 
This shifts the b rden t~ the 
non-moving party to prtoduce 
evidence sufficient to support a jury 
Brenda Winebarger 
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verdict in his favor. See id. at 256-57. 
The non-moving party must go 
beyond the pleadings and show "by 
[his] affidavits, or by the depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, or 
admissions on file" that a genuine 
issue of material fact exists. Celotex, 
477 U.S. at 324. 
However, the Court is "not required to 
comb through the record to find some 
reason to deny a motion for summary 
judgment." Carmen v. San Francisco 
Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 
· 1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Forsberg v. Pac. Northwest Bell Tel. 
Co,, 840 F.2d 1409, 1418 (9th Cir. 
1988)). Instead, the "party opposing 
summary judgment must direct [the 
Court's] attention to specific triable 
[*S] facts." Southern California Gas 
Co.· v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 
885,889 (9th Cir. 2003). Statements 
in a brief, unsupported by the record, 
cannot create an issue of fact. Barnes 
v. Independent Auto. Dealers, 64 F.3d 
1389, 1396 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1995). 
B. Statutory Employer Immunity 
Under I.e. § 72•223 Does Not 
Apply to the United States on 
these Facts. 
HN4 GeneraUy, under the Idaho 
Worker's Compensation Act's (the 
"Act") exclusive remedy rule, an 
injured employee is limited to 
recovery in worker's compensation 
and cannot sue in tort. Fuhriman v. 
State, 143 Idaho 800, 153 P.3d 480, 
484 (Idaho 2007). An exception to 
that rule allows an injured employee 
to seek damages for injuries caused 
by third parties, even f the em loyee 
is also entitled to worker's 
compensation. Ho ever, I such 
third-party liability cl ims canpot be 
asserted against so-c lied "sta;tutory 
employers," who a eitheJ: (l) 
"those employers des ribed in ection 
72-216, Idaho Code, having under 
them contractors and subcont actors 
who have in fact co plied wi h the 
provisions of section 72-301, Idaho 
Code" or (2) "the ow er or le see of 
premises, or other erson · ho is 
virtually the proprieto or oper tor of 
the business there car ied on . [*6] . 
. " I.C. § 72-223. 
To identify a statutor employ~r, the 
court first considers the st~tutory 
definition of 11employe "found lat I.C. 
§ 72-102(13)(a). Fuh iman, lj3 P.3d 
at· 484 (internal cita ions on,itted). 
There1 "employer" is efined a!s "any 
person who has expre sly or im'pliedly 
hired or contracted he servi~es of 
another." I.C. § 72-1 2(13)(a~. This 
definition includes c ntractoris and 
subcontractors. Kol r v. r:assia 
County, 142 Idaho 46, 12V P.3d 
962, 968 (Idaho 200 ). An en,ployer 
who makes use of a contractbr's or 
subcontractor's empl yees. q~alifies 
as a category one sta tory e1ployer 
and is immune fro suits ir tort; 
Venters v. Sorrento el., Ina., 141 
I 
Idaho 245, 108 P.3d 92, 396 :(Idaho 
200s). I 
The Government argu s for statutory 
I 
employer immunity n these! facts. 
First, the Government contractfd with 
Parsons, who acted s the general 
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project, and Parsons then qualify for statut ry employer 
subcontracted with Extreme Electric. immunity. Liberty initi ted this ection 
Second, both. the general contract pursuant to HNS th Feder~I Tort 
and subcontract required worker's Claims Act (FTCA), w ich provides a 
~ornpens~tion ins.urance be provided limited waiver of sover ign imniunity. 
m compliance w,th I.C. § 72~301. That limited [*8] wai er permits tort 
Accordingly, the Government · actions · against the f~deral 
contends that it "expressly or government, but the nited St~tes is 
impliedly hired and/or contracted the liable only in the same manner bnd to 
se~yices of another" and ~herefore is ~he. . same exte~t s a 8rivate 
a category [*7] one statutory 1nd1v1dual under like circumstances 
employer, immune from third-party under the law of "the lace whJre the 
liability. act or omission occur ed.'' 28 µ.s.c. 
Liberty argues that the Government §§ 1346(b), 2674. Th Ninth ~prcuit, 
is not subject to the Idaho's Worker's in ~naly~ing an action broughtj under 
Compensation Act because the Cahforn1a's worker's ompen~ations 
Government does not fit within the laws, held that altho gh the ~ederal 
Act's definition of ''person," cannot government could n er be exactly 
be· an "employer" under the Act and like a private actor, " court'J.s·ob in 
therefore cannot quality for applying the .standar is to fi d the 
third-party immunity. See I.C. most reasonable anal gy ... [and] 
72-102(24) (defining person as "the most courts have hel . , . t at the 
state or any political subdivision United States should be entitled to 
thereof, any individual, partnership, the same immunity fr m suit epjoyed 
firm, association, trust, corporation . by a private emplo r coveriled by 
•. "). Liberty also argues that because state workmen's com ensation laws.
11 
the Government is not required to LaBarge v. County o Mariposa, 798 
provide worker's compensation F.2d 364, 367 (9th ir. 1986j). See 
coverage under the Act and would also Rivera v. U.S. rmy Cqrps of 
not be liable for compensation if Eng'rs, 891 F.2d 56 568 ($th Cir. 
Extreme Electric had not complied 1990) (finding stat tory eniployer 
with the requirements to obtain rule applies to the Uni ed State~ when 
worker's compensation coverage
1 
it it is sued under the FTCA). 
is not entitled to immunity. Lastly, Accordingly, the Co rt findr
1 
that 
liberty contends that the Government statutory employer i munity under 
cannot 11boot$trap" into statutory Idaho's Worker's Co pensatipn Act 
employer status. ~an apply to the Unit d Statej' 
The Court will first address Liberty's The next issue is wh ther statutory 
argument that because the employer immunity rovided/ for in 
Government Is not subject to Idaho's I.C. § 72-223 does in [*9] fac,t app.ly 
Worker's Compensation Act1 it cannot to the United State In thi~ case. 
Brenda Winebarger j 
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When analyzing whether the United 
States is a statutory employer, the 
Court must focus on the agency or 
department of the United States 
which contracted for the work. See 
Struhs ·v. Protection Technologies, 
Inc., 133 Idaho 715, 992 P.2d 164, 
169 (Idaho 1999) (quoting Izard v. 
United States, 946 F.2d 1492, 1495 
(10th Cir. 1991)). See also Rivera v. 
U.S. Army Corps of £ng'rs, 891 F.2d 
567, 568 (5th Cir. 1990); Pendley v. 
United States, 856 F.2d 699, 702 (4th 
Cir. 1988). 
The Struhs case is particularly 
instructive to the issue before the 
Court. In Struhs, the United States 
Department of Energy (DOE) 
contracted with EG&G Idaho, Inc. 
("EG&G") to operate certain Idaho 
National Engineering Laboratory 
(INEL) facilities. 1 EG&G in turn 
contracted with American Protective 
Services (APS) to provide security 
services at INEL. Plaintiff Struhs 
worked for APS and while in the 
course of his employment, he was 
driving a vehicle which was struck 
and injured by a negligently operated 
U.S. Army vehicle. 992 P.2d at 
165-66. Notably, the contract 
between the DOE and EG&G was an 
"allowable cost and fee contract," 
under which DOE paid actual costs 
for EG&G expenses, including 
[*10] payments for worker's 
compensation premiums. Id. 
I I . 
The Idaho Supreme urt fou~d that 
the DOE, "which indi ctly employed 
Struhs through its ontracts with 
EG&G and the subco tract wit~ APS, 
was Struhs' statutory employer. 11 Id. 
at 169. On the other and, th~ court 
found that "the Arm which ~ad no 
contractual or emplo~ment 
relationship with St uhs, Wqs not 
Struhs' statutory emp oyer .. j_[and] 
[a]s with any third- arty tortfeasor 
where the empl yer isl not 
concurrently negligen , the Arrhy was 
fully liable for any da ages sOffered 
by Struhs ... " Id. \ . 
In the Complaint, Lib alleg~s that 
the Department of Defens~, the 
Department of the ir Force, and 
Mountain Home Air orce Ba~e are 
responsible for Perkin I injuri~s. The 
record before the Cou t shows lthat it 
was the Army Corps of Engi1neers, 
through a general ontractdr and 
subcontractors, that contractkd fcir 
the work and indire tly ernbloyed 
Perkins. (Derbridge A ., Exs. ~' 8.) 2 
The [*11] Govern ent co~tends 
that, through these ontract?rs, it 
was the statutory em p oyer of Aerkins 
and immune from thir -party li~bi.lity 
under I.C. § 72-223. n making this 
argument, the G vemme~t fs 
contending that it sh uld be trieated 
as one monolithic e tity. Hor,evei", 
pursuant to Struhs, t e Court 
1
is not 
to look at the nited States 
Government as a wh le but iMstead 
I 
silent as to\whether . 
1 The "INEL" is now known as the Idaho National Laboratory, or "INL. 11 
~ The excerpted portions of the relevant contracts that have been placed In the record a 
the contracts are similar to the rtallowable cost and fee contracts" Involved in Strohs. 









2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138291, *11 I 
must examine the individual federal independent contrac or or fJr any 
agencies involved in the matter. The other reason, is n t the J direct 
Government attempts to bring the employer of the w rkmen lthere 
Department of Defense, the Air Force employed." The si nificant fact, 
and Mountain Home Air Force Base according to the I aho Su reme 
into the contracts between the Corps, Court, was that Fred eyer ''\~as not 
Parsons and Extreme Electric. in the business of con truction or roof 
However, there is no evidence before installation." Id. at 212-13 
the Court that connects these entities ( discussing that to e a st~tutory 
to the general contractor and the employer, the work b ing carried out 
subcontractor. Rather, it appears that by the independent c ntractor pn the 
if there is a government entity entitled owner or proprietor's premisel must 
to claim statutory employer status, it have been the type t at could have 
Id b h been carried out by th emplo)tees of 
wou e t e Army Corps of the owner or propriet r in the tourse 
Engineers, not one or more of the 
Department of Defense entities. of its usual trade or bu~iness) 
(internal quotations o itted). On th:e 
At the hearing on. this motion, the 
parties spent considerable time 
addressing the case of Robison v. 
Bateman-Hall, 139 Idaho 207, 76 P.3d 
9.51 (tdaho 2003). In that case, the 
supermarket company Fred Meyer 
contracted with a general contractor, 
Bateman-Hall, to construct a building 
on [* 12] a site owned by Fred Meyer. 
Id., at 952. Bateman-Hall then 
contracted with Robison Roofing to 
perform the roofing work on the 
project. An employee of Robison 
Roofing was injured in the course of 
his work, and brought a third-party 
claim against Fred Meyer. Id. at 
952-53. The Idaho Supreme Court 
held that Fred Meyer was not a 
statutory empjoyer under category 
two of the statute, which exempts 
from liability "the owner or lessee of 
premises, or other person who is 
virtually the proprietor or operator of 
the business there carried on, but 
who, by reason of there being an 
other hand, the court ent on to find 
[*13] that Bateman~ all, the g1 neral 
contractor, was i mune from 
third-party· tort Ii bility under 
category one of the s tute. 
Arguably, Fred Meyer n Robison was 
in much the same osition ~s the 
I . 
DOE in Struhs. B th indjrectly 
employed the injured erson tHrough 
general and subcontr cts. Ho~ever, 
in Struhs the court hel that th:e DOE 
was a statutory emplo er; in Rqbison, 
the same court held t at Fred JMeyer 
was not a statut ry em~loyer. 
Notably, Fred Mey r's sta~utory 
employer status was only analyzed 
I 
under category two f the statute. 
The Court has eviewedl the 
underlying briefs filed with the\Idaho 
Supreme Court in th Robisom case 
and concludes from t at review that 
the issue of whether red Mey~r was 
immune from third party li1abllity 
under category one w s never fiaised. 
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clear at the hearing that it was not argues that Parsons the g neral 
seeking statutory employer status contractor acting inde endentlY, was 
under category two. Accordingly, the [* 15] the only pos ibly netjligent 
holding in Robison is inapposite to actor and the Govern ent cantot be 
the facts before the Court. Put simply, held liable for its acts. 
the Idaho Supreme Court did not 
consider the same issue in Robison as It is correct that unde the FTC , the 
is before this Court in the instant United States cannot be held I liable 
case. Instead, as discussed above, under a strict liabili theor'rl, See 
this case is analogous to Struhs and Lairdv. Nelms, 406 U. · 797, 718-99, 
i I' Ith th t th ·ty [*l4 ] th 92 S. Ct. 1899, 32 . Ed. 2tl 499 n ine w a au on ' e {1972). However., HN under Idaho 
Court finds that the Government is 
tort law, employees an workmen, or 
not a category one statutory those who confer a tan ible benefit to 
employer. 3 , 
c. Idaho Premises Liability Law 
Does Not Preclude Plaintiff's 
Claim against the United States 
on the Present Record. 
HN6 Under the FTCA, the United 
States cannot be held liable on any 
state law imposing strtct liability. See 
Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 804, 92 
S. Ct. 1899, 32 L. Ed. 2d 499 (1972). 
Additionally, the United States may 
only be held liable if its own 
employees acted negligently and 
cannot be held liable under the theory 
of vicarious liability. See Logue v. 
United States, 412 U.S. 521, 532-33, 
93 S. Ct. 2215, 37 L. Ed. 2d 121 
(1973); 28 u.s.c. § 1346(b). 
The Government contends that 
Idaho's premises liability law creates 
strict liability and therefore the 
Government cannot be found liable 
for such claims. The Government also 
the landowner, are treatetl as 
invitees. See Keller v. Holiday\ Inns, 
Inc., 105 Idaho 649, 71 P.2d 11112, 
1116 (Idaho Ct. A p, 1983). A 
landowner owes a co rnon lav!J duty 
of care to an invite to kee the 
premises In reas nably safe 
condition, or to warn of hidden or 
concealed dangers. olzhei er v. 
Johannesen, 125 ldah 397, 8711 P.2d 
814,817 (Idaho 1994). Howev~r, this 
is not strict liability, i . . , if an invitee 
is injured if the pr mises ,. re in 
reasonably · safe co dition, or. .jf 
warned of hidden or con¢ealed 
dangers, the landown r is not\ liable 
for such injuries. A ordingly, the 
claims against the G vernrnent are 
not barred on those g ounds. \ 
The Government lso cofirectly 
asserts that it cannot e liable fior the 
negligent acts of th Independent 
I 
contractor, Parsons. See (Jlnited 
States v. Orleans, 25 u.s.l 807, 
3 Importantly, the dlstlnctlon here pertains to the negligence Plaintiff has alleged galnst the ~articular 
Department of Defense entities. If the negligence claim was made against the Army C s of Engineers, the 
result would be different. And, equally Importantly, this decision does not presume tha such negligf
1 
nee has 
been proved - that burden remains to be met by Pliillntlff, , 
Branda Winebarger 
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813-14, 96 S. Ct. 1971, 48 L. Ed. 2d although additional aJ trial 
I 
390 (1976). This is one of the might very well su slllch a 
exceptions to the waiver of sovereign defense. 1
1 
[*16] immunity. Id. See Logue v. 
United States, 412 U.S. 521, 532-33, D. Whether the E ployer1 was 
93 S. Ct. 2215, 37 L. Ed. 2d 121 Negligent is a Ques ion of ~act . . 
{1973); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The Government ap ars to jargue 
However, although there is no dispute that whatever negllge ce therejmight 
that Parsons was an independent be is attributable on y to E1treme 
contractor, it is not clear from the Electric, and thus is a bar \o the 
record whether Parsons had a duty to Government being held ~iable, 
clear the roads and sidewalks of snow entitling the Governm nt to surpmary 
and ice as alleged by the Government. judgment. The Gover ment co~tends 
The only evidence in support of this that Extreme Electric was negligent 
contention is the deposition of because Perkins' upervis9r at 
Brannon Brown, an Extreme Electric Extreme Electric, who was the_jdriver 
employee, who, when asked who was of the van, parked th van facirg the 
responsible for the Ice removal on the wrong way on the str et so tHat the 
road or work site, responded: "I think passengers had to exit into the tTiiddle 
it was the contractor, the general of the street, rather t an onto ja curb 
contractor, Parsons." (Brown Dep., at or sidewalk. (See Per ins Dep.\at 23, 
p. 40, Dkt. 28-7.) While probative, Dkt. 28-8.) i 
Mr. Brown's statement is not , 
dispositive for showing that it was the HNB_Under Idaho law where ~oth an 
negligent act of an independent employer and third pa y are d~emed 
contractor that caused Mr. Perkins' negligent, the emplo ee's dar' ages 
fall and subsequent injury. The are apportioned etween the 
inferences that can reasonably be employer and thir party, See 
drawn from other evidence in the Runcorn v. Shearer umber f rods., 
record, which must be construed 107 Idaho 389, 690 P.2d 324!, 331 
against the Government, create an (Idaho 1984). It ap ears to be an 
issue of fact upon this question, open question und r Idahp law 
particularly where nothing has been whether a third-par may b~ liable 
submitted that would establish that for less than its o n negligence 
such a duty had been transferred percentage share of he dam~ges if 
under common law or by contract the amount of worker' comperysation 
during the construction process from benefits [*18] paid out is greater 
the landowner, where it would than .the amount t e employer's 
ordinarily lie, to the [*17] general assessed negligence ight yielld as a 
contractor. Accordingly, the percentage of any to al dama$es (in 
Government will not be granted an employee's law uit against a 
summary judgment on this defense, I 
Brenda Winebarger 
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third-party). 4 Regardless, on the of America's Motion for Su I mary 
present record the issue of Extreme Judgment (Dkt. 28) is DENIED. 
Electric's alleged negligence 
compared to the Government's DATED: November 3 , 2011 
alleged negligence, and any resulting 
implications as to the Government's /s/ Ronald E. Bush 
potential liability, are questions of fact 
that preclude summary judgment on Honorable Ronald E. 
this particular defense. 
III. 
ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that Defendant [*19] United States 
U. S. Magistrate Judg 
I 4 Runcorn stands for the proposition that an Injured employee should not obtain a dou le recoveryJ through 
a third-party tort action, which led to the holding in that case concerning the offset (in th amount of;worl<er's 
compensation payments made to the employee) to which a third-party defendant might b entitled In ~he event 
of a damage award a galnst that defendant. Notably, however, Runcorn Involved joint and everal llablllty rather 
than the comparative negligence doctrine that exists today, which leaves unanswered ho the statut~ry policy 
applled by the court in Runcorn would be l.ltilized in a case involving a special verdict a signing coniparative 
negligence among multiple tortfeasors. · l 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND ) 
GAME, et. al. ) 
) 
Defendants. ) ___________ ) 
CASE NO. CV12-146 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
MEMORANDUM ORDER 
State of Idaho Department of Fish and Game (Department) has filed a 
motion for summary judgment, based on their assertion that the Department is a 
statutory employer in accordance with Idaho worker's compensation law and 
therefore immune from damages from claims resulting from Plaintiff Krinitt's 
(Krinitt) allegation of Department's negligence. 
BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
Krinitt's son, also named Perry Krinitt, (hereinafter referred to as Perry) 
was an employee of Leading Edge Aviation. Leading Edge Aviation provided 
aviation services to various government agencies, including the Idaho 
Department of Fish and Garnet Perry was killed when the helicopter he was 
piloting crashed. The helicopter was en route to the Selway River, where the two 
passengers were to conduct a fish survey for the Department. 
Memorandum Order-1 
00057 
Expert witnesses attributed the cause of the crash to a clip board that hit 
the tail rotor. Evidence shows that one of the passengers became sick and 
opened the helicopter door, dropping her clip board in the process. 
Krinitt filed a wrongful death suit, contending the accident was caused by 
the negligence of the Department. The Department filed a summary judgment 
motion, addressing the negligence claim. The District Court granted the motion, 
finding that Krinitt failed to prove that the Department's negligence caused the 
accident. Krinitt appealed that decision to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court found that the circumstantial evidence provided 
evidence to establish negligence and proximate cause. Krinitt v. Idaho Dept. 
Fish and Game, 159 Idaho 125, __ , 357 P.3d 850,854 (2015). The Court 
determined a jury could conclude that the accident would not have happened if 
the passenger had kept control of the clipboard. Id., 357 P.3d at 855. The case 
was remanded back to District Court. 
Department then filed a summary judgment motion on the basis of 
statutory·immunity. 
LAW 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law." /.R.C.P. 56(c). Department has presented no issues of fact 
in their motion for summary judgment, but present questions of law relating to the 
status of the Department as a statutory employer, shielded from tort liability. See 
Rhodes v. Sunshine Min. Co., 113 Idaho 162, 164, 742 P.2d 417,419 (1987). 
Idaho's worker's compensation law removes, with a few exceptions, all 
workplace injuries from 'private controversy.' Kolar v. Cassia County 142 Idaho 
346,351,127 P.3d 962,967 (2005), quoting I.C.§ 72-210. Under what is called 
the exclusive remedy rule, an injured employee is limited to his worker's 
compensation recovery, and can not sue in tort. Fuhriman v. State Dept. of 
Memorandum Order-2 
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Trans. 143 Idaho 800, 804, 153 P.3d 480, 484 (2007). Fuhriman explains the 
exceptions to the exclusive remedy rule: 
... I.C. § 72-223 provides an exception to the exclusive remedy rule. Even 
if an injured employee is entitled to compensation under the Worker's 
Compensation Law, a third party may still have legal liability to the injured 
person. I.C. § 72-223(1). The statute specifically excludes certain 
employers from third party liability. First, the statute excludes from third 
party liability "those employers described in section 72-216, Idaho Code, 
having under them contractors or subcontractors who have in fact 
complied with the provisions of section 72-301, Idaho Code [requiring 
employers to secure payment of compensation] .... " Id .... 
In determining whether a party is immune to an I.C. § 72-223 third party 
liability suit, we 'look to the previously established statutory definition of 
'employer' found in [I.C. § 72-102(13)(a) ], as interpreted by this Court.' 
Venters v. Sorrento Delaware. Inc., 141 Idaho 245. 249, 108 P.3d 392, 
396 (2005). That definition has two categories 1• Under the first category, a 
statutory employer 'means any person who has expressly or impliedly 
hired or contracted the services of another. It includes contractors and 
subcontractors. I.C. § 72-102(13)(a}. In order to qualify as a category one 
statutory employer, the employer by contracting or subcontracting out 
services, must be liable to pay worker's compensation benefits if the direct 
employer does not. 
The Court has summarized the I.C.§ 72-223 category one protection for 
employers as including 'employers who make use of a contractor's or 
subcontractor's employees.' 
Id., footnote added 
DISCUSSION 
Department summarizes their argument as follows: 
Krinitt was employed by Leading Edge as a pilot. By virtue of IDFG's 
contractual relationship with Krinitt's employer, Leading Edge, Krinitt was 
· a statutory employee of IDFG. As a statutory employee of IDFG, any 
recovery by Krinitt is limited by Idaho's worker's compensation law, which 
precludes any suit in tort by him or others claiming through him. Thus, 
IDFG as Krinitt's statutory employer is entitled to tort immunity pursuant to 
1.C. § 72-223. 
Department's memorandum in support of summary judgment, p. 5. 
1 The second example is not relevant under our considered facts. 
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Krinitt argues that Department was not his son's statutory employer, and 
even if he was, the Department has waived this argument. 
1. Department as Perry's statutory employer. Krinitt argues that the 
requisite privily does not exist between Department and Leading Edge aviation, 
Perry's employer. The Department of Interior (DOI), Krinitt argues, was the entity 
that contracted with Leading Edge, not Department. The DOI had no obligation 
to provide worker's compensation coverage under Idaho law, federal law, or any 
contract between DOI and Department. 
To support their argument that Department was a statutory employer of 
Perry Krinitt, the Department provides copies of the Service Level Agreement 
between the Department of Interior and the Department, and a contract produced 
during discovery by Leading Edge Aviation. Department argues that these 
documents show that Department contracted with Leading Edge for aviation 
services. 
The Service Level Agreement states that the Department and DOI entered 
into the agreement to establish aviation services "specifically for and behalf of the 
State of Idaho-Idaho Fish and Game." Aft. of P. Johnson, attachment 2, p. 2. In 
essence, the Department contracted with DOI to manage and insure the quality 
of their needed aviation services. 
In turn, in order for Leading Edge to contract to provide aviation services 
for Department, they had to comply with the requirements outlined in Attachment 
3 to Johnson's affidavit. 
Although Krinitt does not supply any signatory pages to any of these 
documents, it is evident from consideration of the documents as a whole that 
Department is a party to the contract with Leading Edge. As an example, the 
Service Level Agreement lists Department duties on pages 3 and 4, including the 
assignment of Department responsibility for the adjudication of any tort claims 
that arise from the use of contracted aircraft. 
The Leading Edge contract (attachment 3, Aff. of P. Johnson) identifies 
State of Idaho Fish and Game Dept. as a user of the contract. Aft. of P. 
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Johnson, attachment 3, Bates# 1451. It does not, however, refer to any 
particular duties of Department. Krinitt points out that contract disputes under 
the Leading Edge contract are subject to the federal law. Aff. of P. Johnson, 
attachment 3, Bates # 1468. However, this is not a contract dispute, but is a tort 
dispute. The Service Level Agreement assigns response to tort suits to the 
Department. 
The definition of employer under Idaho Worker's Compensation law 
includes "any person who has expressly or impliedly hired or contracted the 
services of another." J.C.§ 72-102(13)(a). From the evidence presented, the 
Court concludes that Department, if not expressly, impliedly hired the services of 
Leading Edge Aviation. 
Further, Krinitt has not rebutted by affidavit or other permissible means 
that the contracts presented by Department do not show that Leading Edge was 
a contractor of Department. See I.R.C.P. 56 (e). Krinitt can not rely only on his 
statements that there was not a contractual relationship. See Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). 
Having determined that Leading Edge was a contractor of Department, the 
next step is to determine if Department is an exempt, statutory employer. Idaho 
case law and worker's compensation law indicates that it is. First, Department 
used a contractor, Leading Edge, who did provide worker's compensation 
insurance for Perry Krinitt. /.C. § 72-223, Aft. of P. Johnson, attachment 5. 
In a similar case, Fuhriman v. State, Dept. of Transportation, supra, the 
State.contracted the services of Multiple Concrete Enterprises for a construction 
project. Several employees of Multiple Concrete Enterprises were killed at the 
construction site. Survivors filed a suit against the State DOT, alleging 
negligence in their design of safety zones. ~he Supreme Court found that the 
State was category one statutory ~mployer of the contractor's employees and 
thus was protected from tort suit by the exclusive remedy rule. Id., 143 Idaho at 
805, 153 P.3d at 485. Similarly, the Department contracted through DOI for the 
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aviation services from Leading Edge. The Department was a category one 
statutory employer of Krinitt. 
Krinitt also alleges that DOI involvement in the contracting of Leading 
Edge removes consideration of Idaho worker's compensation law because of the 
Supremacy clause and because the federal government is not subject to Idaho 
worker's compensation law. In Uberty Northwest Ins. Corp. v United States 2011 
WL 6002468, the Idaho District Court found that statutory immunity under the 
Idaho Worker's Compensation scheme can apply to the United States and 
federal government involvement does not remove Idaho Worker's Compensation 
law from consideration. 
2. Waiver of Department's statutory immunity claim. Krinitt also avers 
that the Department has waived the affirmative defense of statutory immunity that 
it is now claiming. Krinitt correctly states that Department failed to raise the 
defense before, despite many opportunities, including in its tort claim, its answer 
to the complaint, an amendment to the complaint, its previous summary 
judgment motion, and its appeal before the Supreme Court. Court imposed 
deadlines for declaring this affirmative defense have long past. 
All parties agree that statutory immunity is an affirmative defense. See 
Fuhriman, 143 Idaho at 803, 153 P.3d at 483. Fuhriman also states that an 
affirmative defense can be raised for the first time on a motion for summary 
judgment when the defense is raised before trial and the opposing party had time 
to argue in opposition. Id. 143 Idaho at 804, 153 P.3d at 484. Krinitt has argued 
in opposition to the affirmative defense, and, although the matter has been up to 
the Supreme Court and back, no trial has been held. The Court finds that under 
Fuhriman, there has been no waiver of the affirmative defense. 
However, as Krinitt points out, on~ of the purposes of the workers 
compensation schemes is to create "sure and certain" relief for on-the-job injuries 
and fatalities, without having to litigate fault. /. C.§ 72-201. Krinitt has been 
litigating fault for four years. In that four years, through depositions, a prior 
summary judgment motion, an appeal to the Supreme Court and a remand back 
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to District Court, and mediation, the issue of statutory immunity was not raised 
until March 21, 2016, when the summary judgment motion now under 
consideration was filed. Krinitt has not had sure and certain relief for the loss of 
his son. Nor has this been a speedy and inexpensive litigation. See J.R.C.P. 
1(a). 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16(a) also provides for the speedy, fair, and 
efficient disposition of a case by requiring the Court to prepare a scheduling 
order. Such order was entered by this Court on February 14, 2013. The order 
imposed the deadline of February 15, 2013 for any amendment of pleadings. 
Any dispositive motions were to be filed by January 31, 2014. Defendant's first 
motion for summary judgment was filed on that date. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16(i) allows the Court to impose sanctions if 
a party fails to follow a scheduling order. The use of sanctions for violating a 
scheduling order is within the discretion of the Court. Peterson v. Mccawley 135 
Idaho 282, 284, 16 P.3d 958,960 (Ct. App. 2000). In fashioning sanctions, a 
trial court should 'balance the equities by comparing the culpability of the · 
disobedient party with the resulting prejudice to the innocent party.' Id., citation 
omitted. 
Certainly, the Department should have known and discovered their 
affirmative defense of statutory immunity long before this time. Department took 
a risk in retaining an out-of-state attorney, who though licensed in Idaho, 
admitted at oral argument that he was not familiar with Idaho worker's 
compensation law. This is an area of law that has been substantially litigated in 
Idaho venues and has been the subject of numerous appellate decisions. 
However, it is also clear that the action of the Department in belatedly filing their 
second motion for summary judgment was not based on intentional misconduct. 
The Department's counsel was unaware of the relevant issue concerning 
immunity based upon worker's compensation and Krinitt's counsel conceded that 
the oversight was based on negligence, not intentional conduct. Krinitt is an 
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innocent party that incurred a great amount of litigation expense and time 
needlessly pursuing a negligent claim. 
I.R.C.P. 16(i) provides that the Court may make such orders that are just 
in determining an appropriate sanction for violation of a court scheduling order. 
The Court may order the most drastic sanction by denying a dispositive motion 
on the basis that it was untimely filed. Krinitt argues this is the appropriate 
remedy but did not support the argument under I.R.C.P. 16(i). Such a drastic 
sanction must not be considered until the Court weighs lesser sanctions and 
finds that less severe sanctions would be inadequate. Peterson, 135 Idaho at 
284, 16 P.3d at 960. 
The Court believes that when the factors required to be considered by 
Peterson are weighed that the just outcome would be a lesser sanction than 
dismissal of the dispositive motion filed by the Department. The oversight 
caused by the Department was unintentional. The oversight was not part of a 
pattern of delay or gamesmanship by the Department. The oversight was 
immediately brought before the Court with the Department acknowledging its 
error. Despite the factors indicating that the Department's actions were not 
egregious, there is no argument that Krinitt was prejudiced by such action. 
The Court finds that the Department's delay in filing its dispositive motion 
was not substantially justified and that there are no circumstances which would 
make the awarding of fees and expenses to Krinitt unjust. 
Department's motion for summary judgment is granted. The Court orders 
that the Department, not the Department's attorney, be ordered to pay Krinitt's 
reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred by the Department's failure to 
comply with the Court's scheduling order which required filing of dispositive 
motions no later than January 31, 2014. Krinitt shall file a memorandum of costs 
and attorney fees pursuant to I.R.C.P 54. The Court will consider all the 
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I, the undersi~n~~eputy Clerk of the above entitled Court, do hereby 
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the Memorandum Order by mail or fax to: 
Peter J. Johnson 
103 E. Indiana, Suite A 
Spokane,V'JA 99207-2317 
Charles H. Carpenter 
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Missoula, Montana 59802 
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JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
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Game .on their Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing with prejudice 
Plaintiff's claim against them .. 
Attorney fees and costs are awarded to Plaintiff from January 31, 2014. 
DATED this~day of June; 2016. 
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) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF ) 
FISH AND GAME, and ) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Defendants-Appellees. ) _________ ) 
TO: IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME et al, AND PETER J. 
JOHNSON,JOHNSON LAW GROUP, 103 E. Indiana, Suite A, Spokane, WA 
99207-2317, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GNEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellant, Perry Krinitt, appeals against the above-named 
respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final judgment in favor of 
respondents entered in the above-entitled action on the 1st day of June, 2016, 
Honorable Judge Fitzmaurice presiding. 
··. 000ti9 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgment described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant 
to Rule 11(a)(1) I.A.R. Appellant notes that the judgment does contain a reference to 
the district court's grant of summary judgment; this may well not affect the running of 
the time for appeal. Appellant also notes that appellees have filed a limited motion 
for reconsideration in the district court, which motion has not yet been ruled on. 
Because of the nature of the motion reconsideration, Appellant has concluded that 
this motion also may not have affected the time for him to appeal. 
3. Appellant currently intends to raise the following issues on appeal: 
(a) Whether the district court properly applied the standards for granting 
summary judgment; 
(b) Whetl1er the district court's factual findings in ruling of the motion for 
summary judgment are supported by the evidence; and 
(c) Whether the district court's legal conclusions in ruling on the motion for 
summary judgment are correct as a matter of law. 
(d) Whether the district erred in finding that appellees had not waived the 
defense of statuto1y employer immunity. 
(e) Whether the district court should have sanctioned appellees by denial of 
their motion for summary judgment. 
(f) Alternatively, whether the sanction awarded to Appellant should have gone 
back to the inception of the claim, rather than to January 31, 2014. 
4. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
5. Appellant requests preparation of a reporter's transcript of the May 2, 2016 
hearing on the motion for summary judgment. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R: 
(a) Defendants' motion for summary judgment, filed March 17, 2016 (including 
all attachments thereto). 
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(b) Plaintiffs opposition to the motion for summary judgment, filed April 13, 
2016 (including all attachments thereto); 
(c) Defendants' reply brief in support of summary judgment, filed April 25, 
2016 (including all attachments thereto); and 
(d) The district court's findings and conclusions entered on June 1, 2016. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice has been served on the court reporter. 
(b) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the transcript. 
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20. See Certificate of Service appended hereto. 
DATED THIS 8th day of July, 2016. 
Respectfully sub~ 
/ ?--" __ .--· 
: Carp,enter 
CARPENT W FIRM, plc 
210 N. Higgins Ave., Ste. 336 
l\1issoula, MT 59802 
Telephone :(406) 543-0511 
Facsimile: ( 406) 258-0365 
carpentc@carpenterlawfirmplc.com 
. Attorney far Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERV1CE 
Pursuant to I.A.R. 17 (1), I hereby certify that a copy of this Notice of 
Appeal has, this 8th day of June, 2016, been mailed to: 
Keith Evans 
K. & K Reporting 
P.O. Box 574 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Peter Johnson 
JOHNSON LAW GROUP 
103 E. Indiana, Suite A 
Spokane, WA 99207-2317 
Lawrence Wasden 
700 W Jefferson St# 210 
Boise, ID 83720-0101 
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